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ABSTRACT

STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF CHANNEL PROGRAM SELECTIONS:
RETAILER’S CHOICE AMONG PARITY TRADE PROMOTIONS
By
AMIT PODDAR
13th June 2007
Committee Chair:

Dr. Naveen Donthu

Major Department:

Marketing

This research tried to explain the role of calculative commitment, loyalty commitment
and power asymmetry on behavioral commitment in a business to business scenario. We
specifically looked at the trade promotion scenario since retailers face more trade
promotions than they can accept and extant research suggests that retailers always choose
trade promotions that offer the greatest immediate benefit. This dissertation addressed the
following managerial question, “How does a firm select a program (trade deal) when all
its vendors offer the same short term economic incentives”. We proposed that other
aspects of retailer’s relationship with its vendors determine / influence the program
selection decision. First, incentives imbedded in channel relationships namely economic
incentives (e.g., access to new products) and social incentives (e.g., affect toward vendor
/ salesperson) lead to a selection decision. Second, the power asymmetry the retailer has
with the various vendors directly impacts decision making and also moderates the impact
of the embedded economic / social incentives. We used commitment theory and an
experimental design to test our model. We find that calculative commitment has the
greatest impact on decision making followed by power asymmetry. We also find that
loyalty commitment has the least impact. We also found that under high power
asymmetry, calculative commitment has a bigger impact than loyalty commitment on
behavioral commitment than under low power asymmetry when loyalty commitment has
a bigger impact.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Economists have long tried to understand choice behavior of decision makers. Classical
economists and decision theorists have used utility theory to explain the choice behavior
of the rational decision maker (Stigler 1966). Classical utility theory has now been
extended into expected utility theory where decision makers are thought to compute the
expected utility of outcomes associated with each decision alternative and choose the
decision alternative with the maximum expected utility (Puto 1987). However the main
problem with expected utility theory has been its inability to account for context effects
(Puto 1987).

This dissertation is an attempt to understand decision choice in a business to business
purchase situation. Our specific goal is to understand how choices are made especially
when short term utilities offered by the different choices are the same. Classical
economic theory which is based on the rational man hypothesis has always held that if a
person is rational, he will always prefer an option that offers better economic benefits.
This view is especially true in a business to business purchase situation where purchase
managers are supposed to make their decisions in a rational manner due to the principle
of “justifiability”(Vyas and Woodside 1984) that exists in business settings. Justifiability
means that all decisions that are made in a business setting have to be justifiable to
outside third parties.
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While the idea of rationality is quite accepted in the marketing and economic literature it
has also faced strong challenges. Tversky and Kahneman (1981) in their work on
prospect theory proved that perfectly rational people make seemingly irrational decisions
depending on how a problem is framed. According to prospect theory people become risk
averse in gains and risk seeking in losses. Therefore, even if the utility offered by two
options is same, depending on how the utility is presented different decision outcomes
can result.

Our focus in this dissertation is to understand the structure and process of this kind of
decision making in a channel situation. In channel situations decision makers have to
make a lot of difficult decisions involving considerable risk. Since our focus is not on
decision framing, we make the assumption that decision makers do make rational choices
when faced with differing options and they always choose options that offer better
economic benefits than those that do not.

However channel members face lots of situations where the decision making is not so
clear cut. Decision makers often have to choose between options that offer same
economic benefits. For example in a retail scenario, there are many new products that vie
for the same shelf space and offer the same margin and short term gain to the retailer.
Similarly, when channel members seek new partners, prospective partners could offer the
same benefits. When we look at trade promotions, it is possible that two vendors offer the
same trade promotion but the retailer is forced to make a choice.
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We try to understand what factors make buyers make a behavioral commitment to one
party versus other especially when both options offer equal short term utilities. What is
the structure of the decision calculus and what processes guides the decision making. We
believe that commitment theory allows us to understand the structure of the decision
process and the heuristic systematic model (HSM) allows us to explain the processes of
decision process. According to commitment theory the behavioral commitment (or the
choice) that is made by one channel member to another member can be predicted using
an economic, psychological and sociological perspective (Iverson and Roy 1994). HSM
theory (Eagly and Chaiken 1993) on the other hand predicts that the importance of these
antecedents would vary depending on the structural relationships between the parties in
the channel. Structural relationships are defined as the power asymmetries that may exist
between the two parties in any channel relationship.

While this structure and process of the decision calculus can work in all kinds of channel
situations, we specifically test it in the trade promotion context. We choose the trade
promotion context because the likelihood of a retailer facing parity situations is much
larger when dealing with trade promotions than in other channel contexts. For example,
while it is true that sometimes channel members can be faced with the prospect of
selecting a channel partner when most of them offer the same short term economic
benefit, the likelihood of such an event occurring is quite small since the number of times
new partners are selected in the lifetime of a firm is also quite small. On the other hand
trade promotions decisions are made on a much more regular basis and thus the
probability increases that managers would be faced with a parity situation very often.
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Moreover, manufacturers can easily learn about and match the trade offers made by
competitors.

From the industry’s point of view understanding of trade promotion choice is a very
important and relevant problem. The consumer packaged goods sector spends around $75
billion on trade promotion (Dreze and Bell 2003) annually. According to latest figures
consumer packaged goods companies spend as much as 16% of overall gross sales on
trade promotions (Wellman 2005). The magnitude of this number becomes apparent
when we compare it with the total money spent on advertising, which is only around $37
billion. Trade promotion overall commands 55% of the total money spent on promotion
(Wellman 2005). The rest of the money is spent on advertising (20%), traditional
consumer promotions (15%) and 10% for account specific consumer promotions
(Wellman 2005). The sheer amount of money spent demands that researchers spend an
adequate amount of time in understanding trade promotions. However literature review
suggests that the trade promotion area is seriously under researched compared to its share
in the overall research on marketing mix budget.

The reasons for this apathy are many. First, trade promotions are considered by managers
and some academics as a “cost of doing business” which leads them to not consider it as
worthy of investigation. Second, and more importantly, trade promotion data is
notoriously hard to collect, as companies consider trade promotion strategies as trade
secrets and therefore loathe sharing them with researchers. These two factors have
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ensured that most literature in trade promotions have used analytical modeling and
simulation as the means of studying the trade promotion phenomenon.

Extant research has tried to answer questions like: why firms promote (Blattberg, Eppen,
and Lieberman 1981; Lal 1990; Raju 1995; Varian 1980), tried to measure the value of
trade promotions (Abraham and Lodish 1990; Blattberg and Levin 1987; Brown 1974;
Chevalier and Curhan 1976; Goodman and Moody 1970; Kopp and Greyser 1987;
Kruger 1987; Quelch 1983; Zerillo and Iacobucci 1995), tried to identify the factors that
lead to successful trade promotions(Mitchel 1985; Quelch 1983) and explain how trade
promotion success is defined (Hardy 1986). Researchers have also tried to understand the
phenomenon of trade promotion by using game theoretic approaches (Kasulis et al. 1999;
Rao, Arjunji, and Murthi 1995) and explained how trade promotion leads to inefficiencies
due to the phenomenon of forward buying (Blattberg and Levin 1987; Buzzell, Quelch,
and Salmon 1990; Lal, Little, and Villas-Boas 1996). In addition research has also
offered suggestions about improving trade promotions using different kinds of
promotions like EDLP (every day low pricing), scan backs, electronic forward buys, etc.
(Ailawadi, Farris, and Shames 1999; Buzzell, Quelch, and Salmon 1990; Dreze and Bell
2003; Zerillo and Iacobucci 1995). Finally research has looked at the ill effects of trade
promotions on long term franchise building (Mohr and Low 1993; Zerillo and Iacobucci
1995).

While a lot of ground has been covered in understanding trade promotions, it is miniscule
when compared to research on consumer promotions and advertising. Moreover, as
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indicated before, most of this research is analytical or simulations-based. Therefore there
exists tremendous scope for adding to our knowledge of trade promotions, especially
using empirical or experimental data. One particular area that is virtually untouched is
choice behavior of retailers in choosing trade promotions. Several recent trends make this
problem worth studying.

First, supermarkets in recent years have shown a tendency to get bigger with each passing
year. Recent studies show that an average supermarket stores carry 30,000 SKU’s
(Boatwright 2001; Morton 2005) and super centers carry anywhere from 70,000 to
80,000 SKU’s (Tarnowski 2006). Second, consolidation in the retail sector has meant that
all manufacturers have become increasingly dependent on a few key retailers to get their
products to the consumer. Combined with these two trends is the increasing competition
in any product category. The combined effect of all these factors has led to an explosion
in trade promotion deals on offer. Consumer price sensitivity and the willingness of
retailers to use their market power have ensured that manufacturers are forced to offer
more trade promotions by forgoing other forms of promotions.

However, this explosion in trade promotions has lead to another greater problem which
can be aptly described as a crisis of plenty. A retailer at any point in time can only accept
a limited number of trade promotions, much less than the overall number of promotions
on offer (Chevalier and Curhan 1976; Murry and Heide 1998). This happens due to the
following two reasons: First, most trade promotions come with a rider. The manufacturer
expects the retailer to perform some tasks in order to avail of the trade promotion.
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Promotions of this type include shelf displays, cooperative advertising etc. Retailers only
have limited ability and display space (Murry and Heide 1998) to take on tasks that
involve coordination with numerous vendors, all of whom want the best support for their
product and want to run “pay for performance” trade promotions.

Second, trade promotions which don’t expect any effort on the part of the retailer (like
off invoice, volume discounts etc) are based on the idea that the economic benefits induce
the retailers to forward buy (Blattberg and Levin 1987). The retailer also understands the
direct economic incentive and retail forward buying is a well documented phenomenon
(Blattberg and Levin 1987; Buzzell, Quelch, and Salmon 1990) . Because the retailer
forward buys and therefore locks up his capital as stock, he can only participate in a
limited number of trade promotions even though theoretically the retailer may want to
avail of all the trade promotions on offer.

Since the retailer can only accept a few trade promotions, he is forced to choose between
the different offers that are available to him. Therefore understanding the choice
mechanism of retailers becomes very important for the vendors as the increased
consolidation of retail industry have meant that the vendors are increasingly dependent on
the retailers agreeing to push their brands versus their competitors. However, very few
researchers have looked at this problem in any detail.

The first research attempt in this direction was made by Heeler, Kearney, and Mehaffet
(1973) who looked at the problem of new product selection by supermarkets. Their focus
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was however on determining the decision process used by retailers (compensatory versus
non-compensatory choice). The second attempt was made by Walters (1989) who
conducted an empirical investigation to find out what determines the level of retailer
trade support. He found empirical evidence to suggest that economic incentives contained
in deals like advertising support, price reductions and product displays significantly affect
retailer support of trade deals. The most recent attempt was made by Murry and Heide
(1998) who studied the role of interpersonal relationships and economic incentives on
retailer participation in trade promotions.

One common thread in the findings of these researchers has been that retailers always
support that vendor who provides superior economic incentives. The following quote
from an executive of Safeway as reported in Murry and Heide (1998) pg 61 brings out
this issue very clearly “Retailers don’t want more partners – we want more profits”.
However the issue doesn’t get solved here. The finding that the retailer will always prefer
a vendor who offers better short term economic incentives is not surprising and every
vendor also knows that. We must also keep in mind that for the vendor the easiest
variable to manipulate in its marketing mix is the incentive. Vendors usually know what
their competitors are offering in terms of the incentives. Therefore if a vendor knows
what the competitor’s incentive is, and also knows that retailers always choose
promotions with the highest short term payoff, then the easiest strategy for the vendor is
to match the economic payoff.
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Therefore our specific research question becomes, “What is the structure and process of
channel program selections, especially when retailers are faced with parity trade
promotions?” When retailers have equal economic benefits flowing from two vendors,
what makes them make a behavioral commitment to one vendor versus the other? What
factors lead to this kind of behavioral commitment?

As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter the same structure and process can also be
applied to many other channel contexts. For example how does a manufacturer choose
between two distributors when both offer same economic benefits, or how does a retailer
choose a between two new products when both offer equal level of sales. In short, this
research can be expanded to include all situations where there is parity in the options
available and there is limitation in the ability to choose multiple options.

In this research commitment theory (Allen and Meyer 1990; Meyer and Allen 1984;
Meyer and Allen 1991) is used to understand and explain the structure of the decision
calculus. We propose that the behavioral commitment of the retailer is a function of the
retailer’s affective, calculative and normative commitment with the key vendor. To
explain the process of the decision calculus we use the heuristic-systematic model (HSM)
(Eagly and Chaiken 1993). Using HSM we posit that the effect of these three types of
commitment is moderated by the power asymmetry that exists between the retailer and
the vendor (Brown, Lusch, and Nicholson 1995). These two theories combined explain
our model of trade promotion selection.
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As mentioned previously, theoretical research has so far not looked at the issue of parity
promotions. This research would attempt to fill this gap in literature. Furthermore, this
research would attempt to examine the impact of the various types of commitment
individually as well as jointly. It can be argued that in real life, mechanisms like affective,
calculative and normative commitment manifest themselves in different combinations
(Bradach and Eccles 1989; Murry and Heide 1998). Therefore “theory tests should
examine the effects of any one of the relevant mechanisms by explicitly controlling for
the others” (Murry and Heide 1998). Also by explicitly controlling and jointly testing the
impact of the various mechanisms we will be able to test for their relative importance in
different power asymmetry situations. This will also allow us to test for the interaction
between the various variables and how they impact trade promotion choice behavior.

This research will use experimental manipulation as a means of detecting the impact of
the independent variables on behavioral commitment. The use of the experimental
methodology in trade promotion research is rare because of the difficulty involved in
manipulating the independent variables. Most of the research in channel choice has been
conducted using the paramorphic (one describing the data rather than testing prior theory)
(Heeler, Kearney, and Mehaffet 1973) approach. Even in channels research the use of
experimental research has been rare (Gaski 1984).

Data collected using a survey method and analyzed with regression, for example, cannot
provide the insights because of three basic problems. First common method bias may
influence the responses of the respondents. The relationship between the independent and
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dependent variables could be an artifact of asking the same respondent questions about
both the independent and dependent variables. Second, while survey research can give
the strength of the relationships it cannot conclusively prove the causal linkages between
two variables. Only experiments where the independent variables are consciously
manipulated by the researcher can provide support for causal linkages. Third, the beta
weights obtained in a regression cannot be compared for strength as the correlations
between the independent variables prevent us from interpreting the beta weights. One
way to compare beta weights without any bias is when the independent variables are
orthogonal to each other. Experimental manipulation would allow us to maintain the
orthogonality of the independent variables thus we will be able to obtain pure beta
weights that can give us a sense of the importance of the independent variables.

The rest of the paper is organized in the following fashion: In the next chapter we provide
a comprehensive review of the trade promotion literature. This will be followed by a
chapter where we develop the conceptual model and present the research hypotheses. The
next chapter would deal with the methodology and analysis, describing in detail how we
develop the manipulations and collected the data and describing the results of the study.
We will discuss analyze the findings and implications of the study in the final chapter.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
There has not been too much work done in the trade promotion field in the last 30 years.
Researchers have mainly focused their attention on consumer promotions which are deals
that are offered by manufacturers directly to consumers or deals offered by retailers to
consumers. In comparison trade promotions are deals that are offered to retailers by
manufacturers. The reason for this lack of focus happens to be the general unavailability
of data in the trade promotion field. In comparison the consumer promotion research has
been greatly helped by the availability of scanner data.

The lack of focus is severe enough that in the last 30 years no comprehensive metaanalysis has been attempted on trade promotions research. Only two studies (Blattberg,
Briesch, and Fox 1995; Raju 1995) have attempted to summarize promotions research.
However, these studies looked at promotions as a whole, including both trade and
consumer promotions. Moreover, both reviews were conducted over10 years ago and a
lot of research in the last 10 years has expanded our understanding of trade promotions.
This literature review attempts to provide an up to date account of what is known about
trade promotions.

The last 30 years have produced research on some very well defined lines. Our goal in
the next few pages would be to enumerate these lines of thought, mention the major
theoretical contributions and also present the empirical findings. For each major topic we
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will elaborate on what the topic means in the context of trade promotions, why it has
been deemed important and what empirical findings have emerged in that area.
Why Firms Promote?
The question that has most concerned researchers is why do firms offer trade promotions?
After all trade promotions don’t build long term franchises. The logic that has been
offered is that firms offer trade promotions in the hope that some of it gets passed by the
retailers as consumer price promotions and these price promotions encourage trial. This
explanation of encouraging trial seems reasonable; however, it doesn’t explain why firms
who are in mature markets still have trade promotions (Raju 1995). The answer
surprisingly has come mainly from the consumer promotions literature. Blattberg, Eppen,
and Lieberman (1981) have argued that retailers use price promotion to shift inventory
holding cost to the consumers, as consumers have lower holding costs.

Others (Raju, Srinivasan, and Lal 1990; Varian 1980) have argued that price discounts
are a result of mixed strategy equilibriums where each firm chooses its prices from
equilibrium probability distributions. Raju, Srinivasan, and Lal (1990) state that in a
competitive market whenever one brand has lower brand equity than the rest, its
competitors know that the weaker brand’s customers can be lured away by price
discounts and tries to do just that. To defend its turf the weaker brand has to use
promotions to keep its customers; the result is that all brands end up promoting. They
also conclude from their theoretical model that weaker brands tend to gain more from
temporary price discounts. On the other hand when all competing brands have a high
brand loyalty, there is a pure equilibrium and no one promotes.
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Another interesting explanation for discounts is provided by Lal (1990) who says that
many brands promote as a form of implicit collusion to prevent the encroachment of
private brands. They come to this conclusion by studying the beverages market and find
that the national brands fight off competition from the local brands by reducing their
prices in alternate periods in an infinite horizon game.
Measuring Value of Trade Promotions
It is now well accepted that trade promotions lead to increased sales in the short run
(Chevalier and Curhan 1976; Hanssens, Parsons, and Schultz 2001; Srinivasan et al. 2004)
if not in the long run. However researchers and practitioners have often wondered if the
increased sales gets translated into increased value captured by the firm (Zerillo and
Iacobucci 1995) in terms of incremental revenue minus the cost of the promotion. The
first researcher to bring this problem out in the open was Brown (1974). He contended
that manufacturers were not able to evaluate the value of trade promotions because they
were not trying hard enough and because of a common perception in industry circles that
trade deals were an uncontrollable cost of doing business (Kopp and Greyser 1987)
therefore not worth investigating.

However, researchers have also struggled to actually measure the profit impact of trade
dollars (Mohr and Low 1993). Researchers and practitioners have long speculated that
trade promotions may actually be value losers (Chevalier and Curhan 1976; Kruger 1987;
Lucas 1996) and have wanted to know the long and short term impact of trade
promotions (Kopp and Greyser 1987; Quelch 1983). It is believed that manufacturers
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blame the retailers for taking advantage of trade promotions and not passing on benefits
to the ultimate consumers (Chevalier and Curhan 1976). Manufacturers claim that trade
promotions only increase the profits of retailers. Interestingly, retailers don’t deny using
trade promotions to shore up their profits (Kumar, Rajiv, and Jeuland 2001). According
to researchers out of the $75 billion dollars spent on trade promotions around 30% goes
straight to the bottom line of the retailers (Kasulis et al. 1999). According to Abraham
and Lodish (1990) only 16% of trade promotion deals are profitable for the manufacturer.

Chevalier and Curhan (1976) looked at the problem from the retailers point of view and
surmised that the impact of promotions on profit for the retailer may not be clear because:
a) Profit per promoted item may be less than the non promoted item
b) Increased sales of promoted items can be offset by reduced sales of the non
promoted items
c) Forward buying may be present and
d) Customers drawn to the store by the promotions may actually end up buying more
products which may increase profits.
They also say that trade promotions may be favorable to retailers when they forward buy
and not favorable to manufacturers when retailer promotions lead to reduced brand value.
Similarly, promotions may be favorable to manufacturers and unfavorable to retailers
when increased price cutting happens at the retailer level to prevent undercutting by their
competitors.
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Chevalier and Curhan (1976) while studying the trade promotions accepted by a retail
chain came to the conclusion that trade promotions were quite profitable for the retailers.
They however warned that if all the costs of trade promotions, like advertising, display
set up, display rent etc were charged to promotions then the value of promotions might be
negative. They also said that minus all expenses, the real benefits of trade promotions
flowed to the retailers to the extent of forward buying that they indulged in.

Abraham and Lodish (1987) developed an expert based system called PROMOTER to
determine the value of trade promotions. They took data commonly available with a
company and tried to determine the base level of sales when there is no promotion. This
allowed them to determine the impact of various types of trade promotions. They
calculated the profitability of the different trade promotions by first calculating the
incremental profit. Then they subtracted the total cost of the promotion which they
classified as belonging to one of two types: the variable cost of the promotion and the
fixed cost of the promotion. They point out that the incremental units sold due to a
promotion can be different from the total units sold on promotion. This means that even
though a lot of products get sold due to the promotion, the total incremental benefit might
be less or even negative if the base level of the sales are actually equal to the promoted
sales level. Their attempt was similar to the attempt of Goodman and Moody (1970) who
developed a system to measure the effect of trade promotions on sales of the
manufacturer. Lucas (1996) mentions two proprietary studies, the first of which found
that companies spending more than 60% of their total budget on promotions generate a
significantly lower return on investment than those which spend a majority of their
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budget on above line advertising. The second study using retailer scanner data suggested
that the impact of trade promotions is short term and has little impact on the underlying
base sales.

Blattberg and Levin (1987) try a modeling approach to describe how retailers behave
when offered trade promotions. They develop a model to (1) evaluate individual
promotions, (2) to identify the best trade promotions for each size and in each
geographical area, (3) to evaluate future promotional plans and (4) to develop trade
promotion tactics. They make an important point that if promotions don’t increase
consumer sales then they merely shift the timing of the retailers purchase. Empirically
they find that trade promotions do not pay out for the manufacturers, a finding also
corroborated by Lucas (1996). It seems from the studies that the better the evaluation
method, the more money the manufacturer seems to loose (Kruger 1987).
Trade Promotion Success Factors
Researchers have speculated about the likely factors that lead to successful trade
promotions. Some of the research have been conceptual (Mitchel 1985; Quelch 1983)
while others have used survey methodology (Hardy 1986) to elaborate on what
constitutes key success factors. Hardy (1986) contended that to determine success, first
the objectives of the promotion have to be specified. Only after that, can the significant
antecedents to achieving those objectives be specified and tested. He lists the main
objectives of trade promotion as:
a) Achieving short term volume
b) Achieving long term market share
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c) Building Trade inventories
d) Increasing Consumer trials
He proposed that all these objectives can be predicted by promotion period, promotion
cost, trade support, presence of competitive promotions, level of incentives, and the
presence of consumer promotions alongside trade promotions. He found that achieving
trade support to be the most critical factor for achieving the objectives of the firm, a point
that has been raised by other researchers (Chevalier and Curhan 1976; Kopp and Greyser
1987). Hardy (1986) also did a qualitative study and found that in the view of managers,
trade promotions succeeded only when there were high incentives, good trade support,
good sales force support and there is absence of competitive activity. In his view, the
reasons for unsuccessful trade promotions were build-up of inventory from previous
deals, insufficient incentives, competitive promotions and lack of trade support.

Quelch (1983) made suggestions as to what can be done to improve promotion
effectiveness. Among the important suggestions were 1) changing management
orientation from a short term to long term, 2) changing the evaluation of salespeople from
sales based to profit based, 3) improving promotion designs with different discount rates
for leader vs. the follower brands and 4) changing the timing of promotions to prevent
retailers from buying deal to deal.

Walters (1989) conducted an empirical investigation to determine the level of retailer
trade support. He delved deeper into Hardy’s (1986) assertion that trade support is the
most critical factor for achieving success in trade promotions. Since there are lots of trade
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promotions on offer at any point in time, retailers can offer significant support to only a
small number of trade deals (Chevalier and Curhan 1976). Walter’s found empirical
evidence to suggest that economic incentives contained in deals like advertising support,
price reductions and product displays significantly affect retailer support of trade deals.
He also found that time since the last promotion in the same category also has an impact
on the retailer support. He however didn’t find any evidence to suggest that product
related factors (like store sales rank of product category and product- sales rank in
category), manufacturer’s consumer promotions and the price elasticity of product in the
deal had any significant impact on the trade support. This finding that consumer
promotions had no impact on trade support is surprising since the conventional wisdom
says that retailers would be more willing to provide trade support when deals are
accompanied with consumer promotions. It also contradicts the findings of Hardy (1986)
who found evidence that consumer promotions running simultaneously with trade
promotions does have an impact on the success of trade promotions.

Explaining Trade Promotions as a Power Game
Researchers have tried studying trade promotions as a sort of prisoner’s dilemma game.
A prisoner’s dilemma game in game theory means that there is one best strategy for a
firm irrespective of what the competitor does (Rao, Arjunji, and Murthi 1995). This type
of conceptualization has lead to fatalistic views about trade promotion, namely, “it’s a
cost of doing business”. This kind of view has in turn lead to lessening focus on
improving the productivity of trade promotion; with the result that it has become a self
fulfilling prophesy. Rao, Arjunji, and Murthi (1995) have tried modeling trade
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promotions as a series of competitive games and have hypothesized the actions of the
actors depending on a series of promotion outcomes. For example they predict that if a
promotion is profitable regardless of what the competition does, then it is a prisoner’s
dilemma game and both parties end up promoting. On the other hand if promotion is
profitable only if competitor doesn’t promote, then the game type is “battle of sexes” and
it is not possible to go without promotions over a long period of time. They also
empirically try to demonstrate that promotion activity seems to be independent of
competitor actions. Meaning competitors don’t necessarily choose their promotion
actions after taking into account the actions of their competitors.

Kasulis et al.(1999) look at trade promotions as a result of power game between the
manufacturer and the retailer. They look at the relative power between the two parties to
hypothesize the use of different forms of trade promotions that have different objectives.
They make a conceptual framework consisting of a two by two matrix (high-low) of
retailer and manufacturer power. They propose that when the retailer is in a dominant
power position we should observe promotions which shift channel profit from the
manufacturer to the retailer. Examples of such promotions are bill backs, slotting fees,
inventory financing etc. In the case when the supplier is more powerful than retailers the
supplier sees little point in offering trade deals to the retailers. Instead they focus on
doing consumer promotions that increase customer loyalty. In the symmetric case when
both the retailer and supplier are strong he proposes that we should see a higher incidence
of promotions like coop advertising, display advertising and calendar marketing
agreements. Last in the weakly symmetric case where both the retailer and the supplier
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are weak in market attractiveness where both the parties are in survival mode, they are
likely to use promotions that result in temporary price cuts that are passed to the
consumers. Kasulis et al. (1999) don’t test their propositions as they claim (rightly) that
data implied by their propositions are likely to be considered proprietary and very
difficult to obtain using normal survey methodology.

Inefficiencies of Trade Promotion
Researchers have long been concerned that trade promotions adds costs that get passed
on to the ultimate consumer. Buzzell, Quelch, and Salmon (1990) calculated that trade
promotion adds 0.5% - 1.1 % to total retail prices. The key to calculating these costs is
the fact that trade promotion (especially price promotion) has a very distinct impact on
retailer behavior. Trade promotions lead to a phenomenon called forward buying, where
retailers take advantages of lower prices to forward buy for later sales at normal prices
(Blattberg and Levin 1987; Buzzell, Quelch, and Salmon 1990). The retailers have a
motivation to forward buy till the savings from the lower prices are equal to the holding
costs. Buzzell, Quelch, and Salmon (1990) calculated the holding costs to be around 30%
which includes the handling, storage and capital charges. They also estimate that for the
food industry, “increase in manufacturer and distributor costs constitutes around 2.5% of
the total retail sales, including the costs of administering promotional programs” pg 141.

The point that Buzzell, Quelch, and Salmon (1990) make is that trade promotion leads to
two bad effects: 1) It leads to distrust between the manufacturer and distributor which
could lead to higher transaction costs (Williamson 1975) and 2) Forward buying leads to
wasteful expense of storage and diversion which helps no one in particular.
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Also the cost burden of trade promotions is not borne by everyone in equal measure.
People who are classified as “cherry pickers” (bargain hunters) end up getting a lower
price, while normal brand loyal consumers end up paying the higher prices (Buzzell,
Quelch, and Salmon 1990). Therefore the loyal consumers end up subsidizing the nonloyal consumers, which is bad for the manufacturers in the long run. (Buzzell, Quelch,
and Salmon 1990) suggest EDLPP (everyday low purchase price) as a possible solution
to reducing the incidence of forward buying. In a similar vein Lucas (1996) mentions that
United States retailer scanner data proves that the impact of trade promotion is short term
and has a very little impact on the company’s base line sales volume. They also suggest
that incremental volume mainly comes from brand switchers rather than loyalist, echoing
the views of Buzzell, Quelch, and Salmon(1990).

Nelsin, Powell, and Stones (1995) develop a dynamic optimization model to demonstrate
that a manufacturer’ optimal allocation of resources to advertising and trade promotions
depends on the consumer response to retailer promotions, retailers inventory carrying
cost and retailer pass-through behavior. They also hypothesize about a world in which
there is no forward buying. They suggest that in a world without any forward buying,
companies would be required to spend more on steeper trade promotions with lesser
frequency. They assert that forward buying is a barrier that holds back effective use of
trade promotion.

31

Till 1995 the literature had held that forward buying adds inefficiency to the channel
system and the manufacturer is always worse off. All trade deals were considered
unprofitable as the retailers forward buy and keep the promotion to themselves. Lal,
Little, and Villas-Boas (1996) challenge this deeply held belief about the impact of
forward buying on profits. They model the behavior of manufacturers, retailers and
consumers and find that in equilibrium, manufacturers are better of with allowing
forward buying than not allowing forward buying. The intuition behind their surprising
result is that allowing retailers to forward buy reduces the intensity of competition
(between manufacturers) which helps the manufacturer. They also mention that forward
buying does lead to decreased income for the manufacturer as retailers always buys
inventories at lower cost, but they are still better than the prices that would have resulted
in the case when there is no forward buying and higher intensity of competition.

Having demolished the conventional wisdom that forward buying is always bad they do
acknowledge that forward buying does have a negative impact on total channel costs.
Forward buying creates serious logistical dysfunctions leading to excess storage of
inventory which creates inventory storage costs. Furthermore, the boom and busts of
inventory movement called the bullwhip effect, (Ailawadi, Farris, and Shames 1999) has
an impact on the production schedules of the manufacturers who are unable to run their
plants in a smooth manner which adds costs to the manufacturing process.
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Improving Trade Promotions
Researchers have made considerable efforts to try and suggest ways in which trade
promotion inefficiencies can be removed and better use can be made of trade dollars.
Some of the most common suggestions has been EDLPP, Scan backs, electronic-forward
buys etc. The research has concentrated on proving the effectiveness of the new
suggested methods over the old ones. Buzzell, Quelch, and Salmon (1990) were possibly
the first researchers to suggest a policy for EDLPP to reduce the costs of running trade
promotions. They suggested that the retailer should purchase on an as-needed basis and
should be offered a weighted average price reflecting both the deal price and the
promoted price. They suggested that EDLPP would have three benefits. First it will
prevent inventory buildup for both manufacturers and retailers, second it will reduce
selling and administration expenses as retailers would spend less time negotiation trade
deals and third it would lead to a more collaborative relationship between the retailer and
the manufacturer as they will be freed from the zero sum game where one party wins only
at the expense of the other. They also believed that following EDLPP leads to more pass
through thereby leading to lower prices for the consumers.

Nelsin, Powell, and Stones (1995) mention decreasing pass-through, increasing
promotion intensity and increased retailer warehousing ability (which allows forward
buying) as reasons for the move towards EDLPP by manufacturers. They also say that
consumer factors may be preventing a wholesale move towards EDLPP. They mention
that consumer response to deals is still intact and it seems that media advertising is
becoming less effective. Therefore these factors are having an opposing effect on
adoption of EDLPP. It has been speculated that promotional elasticities might far exceed
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the price elasticities, in that case the EDLP strategy becomes questionable (Blattberg,
Briesch, and Fox 1995). Their advice to mangers was to keep a higher shelf price and
then offer discounts to generate more sales and profits.

Zerillo and Iacobucci (1995) offer some suggestions to improve the trade promotion
benefits in the long run. They suggest that trade promotion deals should be structured
with the following guidelines
1) No trade promotions to be allowed that does not require the retailer to add value
to the overall channel. They basically suggest that pure price-off deals which
don’t involve any performance by the retailer should be discouraged.
2) Trade promotions should be designed to reward actions which tend to reduce the
overall cost of the channel.
3) Shift the burden of performance proof to the retailers through the use of rebate
plans.
4) In the case where there is no option but to use quantity discounts, the focus should
be to provide quantity discounts on a retrospective basis (i.e. allotments made on
past performance) Zerillo and Iacobucci (1995) claim that using such a system is
more equitable and also stops practices like forward buying and diverting.

While quite a few authors had praised EDLPP as a solution for deal to deal forward
buying, Ailawadi, Farris, and Shames (1991) claimed that EDLPP is a pretty strong
medicine and may cause its own side effects. They also decry the tendency by
manufacturers to blame trade promotions by stating that in the absence of trade
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promotions they would have to charge much less than their current list prices, basically
agreeing with the stand of Lal, Little, and Villas-Boas (1996). They, however, take a
different view on how to improve trade promotion. They diagnose that the main problem
with trade discounts is that they are linked to quantity bought. This encourages forward
buying and creates problems with pass though. They suggest that the goal of the
manufacturer should be to design trade promotions is such a way that it increases total
channel profit. They suggest and demonstrate through an analytical model (consisting of
one retailer and one supplier) that linking promotional allowances based on the list price
charged by the retailer increases total channel profit. The intuition behind their thinking is
that if the retailer is encouraged to charge a lower price (as the total allowance is
dependent on the price charged to the consumer), then the total base demand would go up,
which would help both the retailer and the manufacturer as the total channel profit
increases. The only hitch with their proposal might be the Robinson-Patman act which
prevents manufacturers from price discrimination when it reduces competition. However,
in their paper they claim that manufacturers have described their suggestions as being
consistent with the relevant provisions of the Robinson-Patman act.

Another problem that has plagued the effective implementation of trade promotion is
retail pass through. This occurs due to a phenomenon called “retailer opportunism”
(Kumar, Rajiv, and Jeuland 2001). Kumar, Rajiv, and Jeuland (2001) state that while the
manufacturer would like the retailer to pass on the trade promotion money to the
consumer as reduced prices every time, the retailer does not do so because of information
asymmetry. The consumer has no way of knowing when the manufacturer has provided a
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trade promotion. If the retailer never passes on a trade promotion, then the consumer can
become suspicious and can take their business elsewhere. However, the retailer resolves
this problem by occasionally charging a lower price when the trade promotion is on and
charging a normal price on other occasions. Kumar, Rajiv, and Jeuland (2001)
demonstrate through an analytical model that this actually is the optimal strategy for the
retailer. This analytical finding is consistent with the findings of previous empirical
findings of Walters (1989) and Curhan and Kopp (1987). They also suggest and
demonstrate that when manufactures advertise their ongoing trade promotions directly to
the consumers it can increase retail pass through thus reducing retailer opportunism.

The move towards eliminating forward buying has led to the creation and advocacy of a
new type of trade promotion, the “scan back” which have increasingly become popular
among manufacturers (Ailawadi 2001). The mechanism of the scan back is that the
retailer is paid the promotion money only when the product is actually sold to the final
consumer (which can be tracked by the scanned sales during the promotion period) and
not on the amount of product bought. This effectively prevents any forward buying
because if the retailer buys extra during the promotion period it is to the retailer’s
disadvantage. This scan back scheme has been promoted as the panacea for trade
promotion ills by the manufacturers. Dreze and Bell (2003) using an analytical model
prove that when the terms of trade are identical (base size, deal size and deal duration)
then manufacturers would always prefer scan back and retailers would always prefer offinvoice. Now considering that scan backs do have benefits in terms of reducing forward
buying (which adds cost to the overall channel system) they suggest that the only way
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manufacturers can convince retailers to consider moving to scan backs is to compensate
them for the loss of profit opportunities caused by moving to scan backs. To prove that
such a system is possible, Dreze and Bell (2003) devise a modified scan back (which they
call a mimic scan back) which leaves the retailer weakly better off and the manufacturer
strictly better off. Thus they create a sort of win-win solution for both parties. They
propose that to create a mimic scan back, the manufacturer has to provide a smaller deal,
but for a longer period of time and also lower the base price of the product. They also
find empirical evidence for scan backs leading to more retail pass-throughs and lower
retail prices consequently resulting in higher sales.

One way suggested for improving the practice of forward buying is by instituting a
system of virtual forward buying, whereby trade promotions deliveries are made in a
staggered manner so as to minimize the capital and storage costs. This method of virtual
forward buying can lead to greater efficiency for both the manufacturer and the retailer
while keeping intact the practice of forward buying (Poddar and Donthu 2007).

Identifying Problems with Trade Promotions
Managers and academics have long believed that trade promotions create more problems
than they solve. Mohr and Low (1993) in a conceptual paper tried to summarize the main
problems. According to them:
1) Trade promotions create adversarial trade relationships
2) Trade promotion spending fuels competitive retaliation
3) Trade promotions steals funds from advertising

37

4) Trade promotions devalues the brand image/ consumer franchise

Zerillo and Iacobucci (1995) suggest that trade deals can have negative effects on the
performance of the manufacturer in the short as well as long run. First, the payment of
trade deals can increase the price of products in the marketplace, leading to an overall
decrease in the demand. Second, the retailer seeing the increasing market price can
actually enter the market with private brands thus the manufacturer may end up creating
its own competitors. Third, due to the high inter retailer competition retailers may
become more aggressive when it comes to demanding more trade deals and thus reduce
the trust between the retailer and the manufacturer. Fourth, due to the high fluctuations in
the market price, consumer may become more price conscious and become constant deal
seekers. Finally as manufacturers dedicate more money towards trade promotions, their
ability to create brand differentiation would decrease over time. This would have a long
term impact on the ability to charge a premium from consumers for the brand.

Zerillo and Iacobucci’s (1995) thoughts were along the lines of empirical findings by
(Dodson, Tybout, and Sternthal 1978; Shoemaker and Shoaf 1977; Strang 1975).
However, the long term effects of promotions still remains a debatable point (Blattberg,
Briesch, and Fox 1995) as there are some researchers who have failed to find a long term
negative impact of promotions (Johnson 1984; Neslin and Shoemaker 1989).

Slotting Fees Controversy
Retailers and wholesalers frequently require that manufacturers pay some sort of fees
before they agree to stock a new product (Bloom, Gundlach, and Cannon 2000). This
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practice is called slotting fees. Therefore, although it is a form of trade promotion, its
impact is not felt by mature products. According to Sudhir and Rao (2006) the amount of
slotting fees varies from $1.4 - $2 million for a national level introduction of a single
SKU. In 1990 the total value of slotting fees paid in the grocery industry only, was $9
billion dollars. This amount was also estimated to be around 16% of new product
introduction cost (Bloom, Gundlach, and Cannon 2000).

There has been a controversy on slotting fees, because researchers have not been able to
agree as to what role slotting fees play in manufacturer-retailer relations. There are two
main schools of thought who have held diametrically opposite views. The first school of
thought is the “efficiency school”, which states that slotting fees actually increase
efficiency in the system by:
1. Providing a signaling mechanism for manufacturers to advertise product
quality. This argument is similar to the argument advanced for advertising,
which also is supposed to act as a signaling mechanism for consumers to
determine product quality.
2. Sharing risks between the retailer and the manufacturer. Since information
asymmetry exits between retailer and manufacturer, an assumption is made
that the retailer knows less than the manufacturer about the probability of
success of the product. Therefore they share a disproportionate amount of risk
during product introduction. Slotting fees helps maintain the balance by
shifting the risk from the retailer to the manufacturer.
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3. Helping efficient allocation of shelf space. In any retailer environment the
demand for shelf space is always more than the supply and with retailers
carrying a huge amount of SKU’s (average over 30,000) new products can
only come in by displacing an older product. Therefore slotting allowances
actually end up helping the retailer make efficient use of shelf space. A
corollary to that is, slotting allowances helps totally new products break into
the shelf space, which in the normal case they would not have been able to do
as they were untested in terms of marketplace performance. finally
4. Slotting allowances increase competition, thus reducing total retail prices.
The efficiency school of thought is the favored one by retailers who want
slotting fees to continue.
The other school of thought called “market power” argues that slotting fees are actually
harmful and damages competition and overall consumer behavior by:
a) Allowing retailers to use their market power to demand and obtain fees. They are
thus able to demand more fees from smaller manufacturers.
b) They undermine channel relationships, as manufacturers are bitter about being
made to pay fees to get their product to the market.
c) Allows a mechanism for price discrimination, when different manufacturers are
made to pay differential fees, thereby increasing the costs disproportionately.
d) Introduces unfair competition for certain manufacturers and retailers who unable
to pay slotting fees just quit the market. And finally
e) Slotting fees end up actually harming the consumer as the fees are ultimately
passed on to the consumers in the form of higher list prices.
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For an excellent review about slotting fees and the two schools of thought see Bloom et
al.(2000). The argument about which school of thought is right is still unresolved. Bloom,
Gundlach, and Cannon (2000) using a survey methodology found that retailers and
manufacturers did not agree that slotting fees constitute a sort of signaling mechanism.
They however did agree that slotting fees leads to shifting of risk from the retailer to the
manufacturer. They found that both retailers and vendors agreed that slotting fees did
benefit large manufacturers and lead to higher prices. Overall Bloom, Gundlach, and
Cannon’s (2000) research seemed to agree with the power school of thought. However a
recent paper by Sudhir and Rao (2006) have challenged the findings of Bloom, Gundlach,
and Cannon (2000) and have suggested that the efficiency theories may actually be right.
They thus found support for the FTC’s stand that slotting fees are not actually anticompetitive. From the above discussion it seems that the jury is still out on this issue.
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CHAPTER 3
MODEL DEVELOPMENT AND HYPOTHESES
From the first two chapters we can see that the problem of choice is a very important
issue that has not been tackled much in the B2B channels area, more so in the trade
promotions area. This dissertation is an attempt to understand decision choice under
different power asymmetry contextual situations especially when the short term utilities
are the same. This choice behavior is important to understand on a theoretical level as
most researchers, while admitting that choice behavior is based on both economic and
non-economic factors have tended to pit economic factors against the non-economic
factors (Murry and Heide 1998) in an attempt to explain behavior. Not surprisingly they
have found economic factors to dominate the non-economic factors. This is especially
true in a business to business setting and adds very little to our further theoretical
understanding. Economists have long established that a rational economic party would
always choose an option that offers a higher economic benefit versus one with a lower
economic benefit. This dissertation acknowledges this economic fact and asks the follow
up question about how decision making happens when the short term economic factors
are the same.

As explained in the first chapter, retailers always face more choices in terms of trade
promotions than they can accept. And since meeting the economic benefit offered by a
trade promotion of a competitor is the easiest, we can be sure that there would be
situations when a retailer would be required to choose from parity trade promotions
offered by different vendors. This poses a particularly unique problem in the business to
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business buying scenario. Since business to business buying takes place in an
organizational environment all decisions are subject to post decisional reviews by the
organization. Therefore all choices made by decision makers have to be justifiable (Vyas
and Woodside 1984). When a product offering has a higher economic utility its
probability of getting selected is very high, however when the product offerings are equal
in utility, the problem of justifiability reduces considerably and other extraneous factors
can be expected to play a big role in decision choice.

When the retail buyer makes a choice among multiple vendors offering parity economic
benefits in the trade deals, it can be said that the retail buyer is making a very strong
behavioral commitment on behalf of the retailer. The retailer is making it known to the
vendors whose promotions are not selected that even though their promotions matched
the economic value offered by the winning promotion, they have decided to make a
commitment to another party. This sort of behavioral commitment is very important to
understand as it is bound to be much stronger than behavioral commitment that is based
on pure economic benefit.

In this dissertation we use psychological, economic and sociological antecedents to
develop a causal model of behavioral commitment (Figure 1). We posit that a strong
behavioral commitment is explained by psychological constructs like affective
commitment and moral commitment. On the other hand the calculative/instrumental
commitment is a rational economic behavior that explains choice in terms of the long
term cost-benefit calculation of making the commitment. The sociological perspective
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explains the choice in terms of the structural dimension, namely the structural
relationship between the two parties (Stern and Reve 1980) which have been
operationalized as the power asymmetry between the parties.

Figure 1: Conceptual Model: Retailer Commitment Model
Power Asymmetry between
Retailer and Vendor

Retailers Calculative
Commitment with Vendor

Retailers Normative
Commitment with Vendor

Retailers Affective
Commitment with Vendor
Salesperson

Behavioral Commitment
of Retailer towards
Vendor’s trade promotion

Retailers Affective
Commitment with Vendor
Organization
Loyalty commitment

Commitment theory provides the structure of the decision process, while the heuristicsystematic model (Eagly and Chaiken 1993) explains the decision process. Both these
theories combined allow us to understand the decision process that managers go through
while deciding among parity options. Next, we will explain the literature on our
dependent and independent variables and develop our hypothesis.
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Behavioral Commitment
The construct behavioral commitment has generally been used more in the sales literature
and has been conceptually defined as the “extent to which an employee plans to continue
membership with the current employer” (Kim 1999). Other researchers have defined it as
propensity to leave, intent to quit and attachment (Halaby 1986; Kim 1999; Mowday,
Porter, and Steers 1882; Price 1997). In organization research it has been defined as the
tendency of engaging in particular lines of work because of the cost of doing otherwise
(Becker 1960). However Meyer and Allen (1984) have argued that this definition is more
like their definition of continuance commitment. Overall researchers have struggled with
developing a meaningful and precise definition for behavioral commitment (Kim and
Frazier 1997). Anderson and Weitz (1992) define behavioral commitment as a
willingness to make short term sacrifices, while Kumar, Sheer, and Steenkamp (1995)
define it as willingness to invest in the relationship. Kim and Frazier(1997) on the other
hand define it as the extent to which a distributor provides special help to its supplier in
times of need.

As can be seen, there are numerous definitions of behavioral commitment and scholars
have not been able to agree as to how behavioral commitment is actually different from
the other dimensions of commitment. It therefore becomes important for us to define
exactly what we mean by behavioral commitment. Previous researchers have not
measured the actual behaviors, but have instead focused on willingness to make short
term sacrifices and/ or investments (Kim and Frazier 1997).
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In our research we try to get over the measurement problem by defining behavioral
commitment as the attachment shown by a retailer to a particular vendor even when the
particular vendor doesn’t offer any additional economic benefits, compared to its
competitors. We further posit that behavioral commitment causally follows attitudinal
commitment which has strong foundation in motivational theory (Ajzen 1991).
According to the theory an individual’s behavior is a function of the intention to perform
that behavior. This intention is in turn determined by two basic factors: a) attitude
towards performing the act and b) the perception of the individual regarding the totality
of the normative pressures concerning the behavior. This theory conceptualizes behavior
as a function of the attitudes towards that behavior. A similar model of commitment has
been used previously by Wiener (1982) who proposed that instrumental motivation
(calculative motivation) and commitment (normative and affective motivation) determine
organizational intentions and behaviors.
Antecedents to Behavioral Commitment
There exist many antecedents to behavioral commitment. The easiest and the most logical
antecedent is one which takes the economic perspective. In this perspective behavioral
commitment occurs because the decision maker makes a cost benefit comparison of the
decision problem (Iverson and Roy 1994). The decision maker takes into account the
likely benefits of making the commitment versus the cost of not doing so. This type of
economic perspective has been defined by scholars (Kim and Frazier 1997; Meyer and
Allen 1984) as calculative commitment.
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The other antecedent to behavioral commitment takes the psychological perspective. This
perspective challenges the economic explanation by focusing on the affective responses
that retail buyers make towards the vendors. It recognizes that decision makers are not
always the rational cold hearted decision makers as they are made out to be. They also
have likes and dislikes and the principle of bounded rationality (Rindfleisch and Heide
1997) ensures that decisions are not made taking into account all the information that is
available to the retailer. Therefore non-economic factors like affect for the salesperson
and affect for the company impact the decision making process.

The final antecedent to behavioral commitment is based on the sociological perspective.
The political structure of the dyad (Stern and Reve 1980) determines the behavioral
interaction between them and the attachment between firms is based on structural ties that
exist between the two focal firms (Geyskens et al. 1996). Power asymmetry is a very
close proxy for the structural ties that exists between two firms. As Kumar, Scheer, and
Steenkamp (1995) remark that just knowing the level of interdependence and dependency
asymmetry between two parties allows an observer to make general baseline predictions
about the nature of their relationship even if the said observer knows nothing “about the
particular history of the channel relationship, the orientation or identity of the partners or
the actions each firm has recently taken” (pg 353).
Calculative commitment
According to some researchers (Anderson and Weitz 1989) commitment is entirely
cognitive and calculative. Calculative commitment (also known as continuance
commitment) is generally believed to develop on the basis of an “economic rationale”
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(Meyer and Allen 1984; Stevens, Beyer, and Trice 1978). It involves rational task
oriented actions whose main goal is maintaining relationships due to a concern for
instrumental gains. It is thought to be devoid of emotions and sentiments for the partner
(Gilliland and Bello 2002). According to Gilliland and Bello (2002) calculative
commitment is “the state of attachment cognitively experienced as a realization of
benefits sacrificed and losses incurred if the relationship were to end”.

It is believed that calculative commitment develops on the basis of two factors: the
magnitude and/or the number of investments that individuals make and the perceived lack
of alternatives (Allen and Meyer 1990). The investments that individuals make are also
called site bets (Becker 1960) in the commitment literature. Side bets are anything of
value that an individual has invested in (e.g. time, effort, money) that could be lost or
considered worthless to the individual if that individual were to cease being part of an
organization (Meyer and Allen 1984). When employees of a firm spend time and effort in
learning a job skill that is not transferable to another organization, the employee becomes
committed to their firm. Allen and Meyer (1990) say that the employee is in effect betting
that the effort s/he put in will pay off in the long run. And to collect the bet the employee
requires continued employment in the organization. According to Becker (1960) the
employees continued employment is positively related to the magnitude and number of
side bets that the employees recognize. If employees cannot recognize the side bets as
existing then continuance commitment does not exist.
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The side bets in organizational setting are transaction specific assets (TSA’s) (Heide 1994;
Williamson 1975) which are assets that are not deployable in another relationship. In a
channel setting a pledge can be thought of as a representing a side bet (Gilliland and
Bello 2002). In the retail setting the presence of an efficient consumer response system/
just in time inventory arrangements with a particular vendor could be side bet that
prevents a retailer from discontinuing its relationship with that vendor. It is to be noted
that side bets or the presence of TSA’s in a retailer –vendor relationship is the exception
rather than the rule. Retailers since they are dealing with hundreds, if not thousands of
vendors cannot afford to create non-transferable assets with each of their vendors.

Continuance or calculative commitment also depends on the lack of alternatives. For an
employee the lack of employment alternatives increase the perceived costs associated
with leaving the organization (Allen and Meyer 1990; Farrel and Rusbult 1981).
Therefore if a retailer has only one major supplier who can provide a particular product
then the commitment that the retailer shows towards that vendor can be called a
calculative commitment. In this scenario calculative commitment appears to be very
much like dependence (Emerson 1962).

It is important to note here that this kind of continuance is only one form of continuance
commitment. It has been referred to in the literature as negative cognitive commitment or
locked-in continuance commitment (Sharma, Young, and Wilkinson 2006; Stebbins
1970). It manifests itself when there are costs and penalties associated with switching
firms.
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The other form of calculative commitment has been called positive cognitive
commitment. In literature this form of commitment is also labeled as “instrumental
commitment”, “value based commitment” and “cognitive-instrumental motivation”
(Caldwell, Chatman, and O'Reilly 1990). This type of value based commitment is based
on a positive orientation towards a relationship and the calculus is forward looking
(Sharma, Young, and Wilkinson 2006). It looks more at the benefits that the relationship
would bestow in the future rather than the losses that might be incurred on leaving the
relationship. Farrel and Rusbult (1981) explicate this type of calculative commitment in
an employee setting, where the employee remains with the organization due to the likely
rewards that s/he may encounter in the future namely the possibility of a promotion.
Since in a trade deal scenario there is no relationship termination, we define and measure
calculative commitment in the manner of instrumental commitment. In our study we will
aim to hold negative calculative commitment constant so that it doesn’t affect the
manipulation of power asymmetry. At the same time we will manipulate positive
calculative commitment so that it acts as an orthogonal factor to power asymmetry.

Since calculative commitment occurs when there is profit associated with continued
participation, the general impact of calculative commitment on intention to continue the
relationship is positive in nature. Therefore if retailers feel that a particular vendor’s trade
promotions are bound to increase in the future, that retailer would try to maintain and
enhance his relationship with that vendor. However some researchers (Kumar, Hibbard,
and Stern 1994) have suggested that calculative commitment has a negative impact on a
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dealers desire to stay in the relationship as intermediaries high in calculative commitment
always seek to develop alternatives to the suppliers. The intuition behind this
counterintuitive argument is that since calculative commitment is based purely on
economic or extrinsic concerns, this type of commitment is rather shallow or short lived.
In the trade promotion context retailers thus are always looking for vendors who can
ensure that their profit from trade promotions remains intact in the event that their
preferred vendor decides to withdraw trade deals.

Also Meyer and Allen (1991) have hypothesized that calculative commitment is also least
likely to correlate positively with performance. One reason for this kind of
counterintuitive hypothesis is that since calculative commitment has been defined in a
manner that is very close to dependence; as the dependence of a party increases that party
tries to minimize it by using dependence balancing (Emerson 1962). However as we
define calculative commitment to be conceptually and structurally different from
dependence, we believe that calculative commitment has a net positive impact on trade
promotion selection. We therefore hypothesize:
H1: Increased calculative commitment of the retailer with the target vendor would
increase the overall behavioral commitment that the retailer demonstrates towards
the target vendor’s trade promotions.

Loyalty commitment
According to Allen and Meyer (1990), there are basically three states of attitudinal
commitment: Calculative, Affective and Normative. We must note that these are states
and not types of commitment as people experience each of these psychological states to
varying degrees. To classify them as types of commitment would mean that they are
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mutually exclusive to each other. Becker (1960) has argued that affect plays a minimal
role in the conceptualization of commitment. However most other researchers believe
that affect plays a very important role in understanding commitment (Arndt 1979;
Bennett and Gabriel 2001; Morgan and Hunt 1994). These researchers believe that the
most common approach to organizational commitment is one where commitment is
considered an affective or emotional attachment to the organization (Allen and Meyer
1990). Allen and Meyer (1990) define affective commitment as “an employee’s
emotional attachment to, identification with and involvement in the organization”. In the
channel setting affective commitment has been conceptualized as the level of unity
present in the channel relationship (Morgan and Hunt 1994; Stern 1986). Affective
commitment is basically conceptualized as commitment to the goals and values of an
organization for its own sake apart from its pure instrumental worth. In terms of trade
promotions it would mean an affect for the vendor after controlling for the value of trade
deals offered by that vendor.

While affective commitment doesn’t flow from any instrumental worth, researchers have
argued (Arndt 1979; Bennett and Gabriel 2001) that sometimes affective motives are
much stronger and effective in developing longer lasting relationships than motives that
are based on avoiding switching costs or lack of alternatives. According to Gilliland and
Bello (2002) while a firm committed out of economic motives could readily break its
relationship when a better deal is offered, a firm committed out of affect and obligation is
less likely to do so. Therefore retailers who have affect for the vendors are less likely to
look at trade deals offered by other vendors.
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That leads us to define commitment which is based on obligation, also called moral
commitment or normative commitment (Allen and Meyer 1990). Normative commitment
refers to the feeling of obligation to stay with an organization or partner (Allen and
Meyer 1990; Kumar, Hibbard, and Stern 1994). According to Allen and Meyer (1990)
moral commitment is viewed as a belief about one’s responsibility to an organization.
Individuals exhibit commitment behaviors solely because they believe it is the right and
moral thing to do. Individuals who feel normative commitment stay with an organization
because they feel “they ought to”, in contrast to calculative commitment where they feel
“they have to” and affective commitment where “they want to”.

The main problem with normative commitment is that it is not readily distinguishable
from affective commitment when measured. These two types of commitment seem to
have some overlap in terms of measurement, although both are independent of calculative
commitment (Allen and Meyer 1990). Also it has been speculated that normative/moral
commitment may be more prevalent and exist as a separate construct from affective
commitment in cultures where there is greater focus on obligation (Sharma, Young, and
Wilkinson 2006). Dawson, Young, and Wilkinson (1997) in (Sharma, Young, and
Wilkinson 2006) state that commitment has different meanings and subsequently
implications in China than in Europe. This is because of cultural and psychic differences
across cultures (Ford 1984; Sousa and Bradley 2006). Gilliland and Bello (2002) merge
the two concepts of affective and normative commitment together and call it loyalty
commitment. According to them loyalty commitment is “the state of attachment to a
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partner experienced as a feeling of allegiance and fruitfulness that is not simply based on
economic motivations” In their study they find that firms find loyalty commitment to be
more “descriptively accurate than commitment based on just friendship or obligation.” In
our study we adopt the concept of loyalty commitment as articulated by Gilliland and
Bello (2002) as a proxy for affective and normative commitment.

Researchers have argued that since affective commitment is not based on instrumental
gains, sometimes highly relational partners do forgo short term gains in anticipation of
equitable treatment in the long run (Gilliland and Bello 2002; Ring and Van de Ven
1994). In the channel context it has also been argued (Kumar, Hibbard, and Stern 1994)
that dealers with high affective commitment demonstrate higher willingness to stay as
well as greater willingness to invest in the relationships. Therefore retailers are likely to
prefer trade promotions from vendors for whom they have higher affective commitment.
Kumar, Hibbard, and Stern (1994) also demonstrate that affective commitment has the
strongest positive association with the beneficial consequences of commitment followed
by moral commitment and only then by calculative commitment. We therefore
hypothesize that:
H2: Increased loyalty commitment of the retailer with the target vendor would
increase the overall behavioral commitment that the retailer demonstrates towards
the target vendor’s trade promotions.
Two forms of Loyalty Commitment
While the organization commitment literature has treated affective commitment as a
unidimensional construct, some researchers have claimed that business to business
relationships are much more complex. According to Tellefsen and Thomas (2005) there
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are two distinct actors when we talk about an exchange partner: The partner’s overall
organization and the partner’s sales representative. Therefore buyers develop
relationships with the selling firms on two levels: loyalty to the selling firm(also called
organizational commitment) and the loyalty to the salesperson (also called personal
commitment) (Johnson, Barksdale Jr., and Boles 2001; Palmatier, Scheer, and Steenkamp
2007; Tellefsen and Thomas 2005).

According to Palmatier, Scheer, and Steenkamp (2007) researchers have not usually
differentiated between the two loyalties when measuring loyalty to the firm, instead they
have ended up measuring the two concepts as one. According to them this is a mistake
and deceptive as the loyalty that the firm enjoys could be composed entirely of salesperson loyalty elements and if the salesperson were to ever defect, the loss of the
salesperson “owned” loyalty can leave firms vulnerable. Palmatier, Scheer, and
Steenkamp (2007) also claim that loyalty to the salesperson should be treated
independently from the loyalty to the organization as the buyer could have more loyalty
to salesperson than the selling firm (Johnson, Barksdale Jr., and Boles 2001).

As discussed in the earlier section the effect of organizational loyalty on behavioral
commitment is well accepted by researchers (Kumar, Hibbard, and Stern 1994).
Researchers claim that loyalty to the selling firm generates positive financial outcomes
for the selling firm (Palmatier, Scheer, and Steenkamp 2007; Zeithaml, Berry, and
Parasuraman 1996) and commitment to the selling firm has a direct and negative impact
of the customers intention to defect (Morgan and Hunt 1994). Similarly we would argue
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that when the retailer believes that the vendor is interested in partnering with the retailer
to increase sales through trade promotions rather than going directly to the consumer
using consumer advertising it develops goal congruity between them and it would
increase the behavioral commitment that the retailer shows towards the vendor.

Kumar, Sheer, and Steenkamp (1995) state that whenever affective commitment is felt to
be high between two firms the bonds characterizing the channel relationship is going to
be strong in both the business and personal arena. Johnson, Barksdale Jr., and Boles(2001)
argue that buyer commitment to the salesperson should play an important role in the
buyers decision making process. The reason provided is that the buyers generally have
more contact with salesperson and that buyers may consider the salesperson to be
synonymous with the vendor. Researchers have found that strong buyer- salesperson
relations increases repurchase intentions (Jones, Mothersbaugh, and Beatty 2000) and
buyer commitment to salesperson is negative related to buyer defection intentions
(Johnson, Barksdale Jr., and Boles 2001). Also commitment to vendor salesperson has a
positive impact on financial outcomes and sales growth of the buyer’s firm (Palmatier,
Scheer, and Steenkamp 2007).

In the trade promotion arena also researchers have argued for a similar effect. Murry and
Heide (1998) hypothesize that interpersonal attachments are likely to increase the
likelihood of retailer participation in trade promotion deals. They based their hypothesis
on early work by Adams (1976)and Salancik (1977) who suggested that strong
interpersonal relationships increase participation. The intuition behind this is that “strong
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interpersonal relationships reflects prior selection and/or socialization between parties”
(Murry and Heide 1998) and these processes end up aligning the goals of the parties,
which for the retailer would mean an increase in bottom line performance from the trade
promotion and for the vendor would be an immediate increase in sales.

From the above discussion we therefore hypothesize that:
H3: Increased personal commitment of the retailer towards the target vendor’s
salesperson would increase the overall behavioral commitment that the retailer
demonstrates towards the target vendor’s trade promotions.
H4: Increased organizational commitment of the retailer towards the target vendor
would increase the overall behavioral commitment that the retailer demonstrates
towards the target vendor’s trade promotion.

Interaction Effects of Calculative Commitment and Affective Commitment
So far in the dissertation our main focus was on how calculative commitment and
different types of affective commitment have an impact on the decision making process
of the retailer. We have focused only on the main effects of each mechanism. However in
real life these factors are likely to manifest themselves in different combinations (Murry
and Heide 1998). Therefore in this section we will hypothesize about various interaction
effects that are likely to occur.

It is important to note here that calculative commitment is an organizational level
independent variable, meaning that calculative commitment has an impact on behavioral
commitment of the retailer independent of the buyer’s personal viewpoint about the
relationship. However the affection that the buyer feels towards the vendor’s salesperson
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or the vendor could be due to the fact that the buyer gets a feeling that the vendor has
goal congruity with the buyer (Murry and Heide 1998). The buyer may feel that the
vendor helps meet the personal goals of the buyer, which could be the primary reason
why he feels affect in the first place. Thus loyalty commitment could represent “utility in
its own right and be a functional substitute” (Murry and Heide 1998) to calculative
commitment. The buyer could use the two forms of loyalty commitment to actually
minimize the impact of calculative commitment.

In other words if the buyer feels commitment to the vendor salesperson or to the vendor
himself, he should discount the effect of any calculative commitment that may exist. The
overall effect would be that the impact of calculative commitment would reduce in the
face of high loyalty to the vendor salesperson or loyalty to the vendor organization.

Therefore we can hypothesize that:
H5a: Increased personal commitment of the retailer towards the target vendor’s
salesperson would decrease the positive effect that calculative commitment has on
the behavioral commitment of the retailer towards the target vendor’s trade
promotions.
H5b: Increased organizational commitment of the retailer towards the target
vendor would decrease the positive effect that calculative commitment has on the
behavioral commitment of the retailer towards the target vendor’s trade
promotions

Direct and Moderating Effects of Power Asymmetry
Researchers have long suspected that power plays a very important role in explaining
relationships in marketing channels. Brown, Lusch, and Nicholson (1995) in a pioneering
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study claimed that in marketing channels, power and its usage can have a “pivotal
impact” on working relationships. They also claimed that power plays a very important
role in a very important aspect of relational exchange namely commitment. Other
researchers have also come to the same conclusion. According to Boyle et al.(1992) a
firms use of power in a channel setting does impact its partner’s views about
relationalism in which as mentioned before, commitment plays a central role. This
suggests that power could have a main effect on commitment towards the vendor’s trade
promotion. Brown, Lusch, and Nicholson (1995) also suggested that there could also be
moderating effects of power and especially power asymmetry on commitment and
various channel performance measures.

To explain the role that power or power asymmetry may play in explaining retailer
behavior we must review how the construct of power has been defined in the literature
and what theory suggests could be its impact on our identified dependent measure.
Emerson’s (1962) view has more or less dominated the conceptual and empirical
explication of the power construct (Dwyer 1980). According to Emerson (1962) the
power of actor A over actor B is the amount of resistance on the part of B, which can be
potentially overcome by A. Emerson (1962) also linked power to the amount of
dependence existing in the dyadic relationship, i.e. channel member A’s power over B is
directly proportional to B’s dependence on A for scarce resources (Dwyer 1980) and
inversely proportional to the availability of those resources outside the A-B relationship.
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However this is not the only conceptualization of power that has been attempted.
According to French and Raven (1959) power of A over B is due to the various sources
of power that exist due to the relationship between A and B. If B perceives that A has the
ability to mediate rewards for B, then A has reward power. If B perceives that A has the
ability to mediate punishment for B, then A has coercive power. If B perceives that A has
a legitimate right to prescribe behavior (e.g. in a franchise situation) then A has legitimate
power. If B identifies with A then A has referent power and finally if B perceives that A
has some special knowledge or expertise then A has expert power. For an excellent
review of how power has been conceptualized we refer readers to Gaski (1984).

However as mentioned before the dominant view in the literature has been that power is a
function of the dependence levels and in this paper we stick to that view. Also most
papers have tried to explain the impact of power using dependence as the proxy for
power.

Researchers have used three different approaches to conceptualizing dependence. First is
the sales and profit approach developed by El-Ansary and Stern (1972) where they claim,
the greater the percentage of sales and profit contributed by the source firm to the target
firm, the greater the targets dependence on the source. Most researchers have used this
approach when operationalizing dependence (Anderson, Lodish, and Weitz 1987; Brown,
Lusch, and Muehling 1983; Kale 1986). Kale (1986) also included the expectation of the
target firm about the future sales contribution of the source firm as an influencer of
current dependence levels. The second approach used to operationalized dependence is
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the role performance approach (Frazier, Gill, and Kale 1989) mainly used by Frazier
(1983). According to this approach how well a source firm carries out its role in channel
performance determines the dependence of the target firm. The third approach to
operationalizing dependence is one proposed by Heide and John(1988). According to
them a target firm’s dependence on a source firm is a function of the transaction specific
assets invested by the target firm in the relationship which can’t be redeployed profitably
in another relationship. This operationalization is very similar to the concept of
calculative commitment and the theory of side bets (Becker 1960).

We use the El-Ansary and Stern (1972) approach to conceptualizing dependence as it is
the most widely used and offers us leeway in the way we can manipulate power
asymmetry. The dependence approach as suggested by Heide and John(1988) is not used
because of the lack of clarity as to how the operationalization is different from negative
calculative commitment. Also it is much harder to operationalize in terms of dependence
asymmetry.

Having given a brief overview of the way power has been defined it is our goal here to
try and understand how power affects behavioral commitment in the context of trade
promotions. Unfortunately the literature doesn’t provide a clear-cut answer to this
question (Frazier, Gill, and Kale 1989). From the literature we know that a target firms
dependence on the source firm (in other word’s the power of the source firm) is related
positively to the source firm’s level of control on the targets behavior (Anderson, Lodish,
and Weitz 1987; Etgar 1976). Frazier (1983) finds that dependence is related positively to
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inter-firm agreement on marketing strategy. On the other hand Brown, Lusch, and
Muehling (1983) find that dependence is related negatively to the frequency of inter-firm
agreements. According to Dwyer(1980) under asymmetrical distributions of power,
weaker members of the dyad show less satisfaction and a negative attitude towards the
rewards that may flow from a channel relationship. This is in consonance with the view
of Gaski (1984) and Kumar, Sheer, and Steenkamp (1995) that the existence of power
asymmetry produces dyadic conflict. It also reflects the views of Walker (1972) that
application of power leads to dissatisfaction on the part of those who are subjected to it,
as an asymmetrical power scenario produces asymmetrical negotiations where the
powerful party always dominates the bargaining (Dwyer and Walker Jr. 1981).

According to Stern and Reve (1980) channel relationships that are asymmetric in
dependence and power tend to be more dysfunctional and less trusting than symmetrical
relationships. Also as the channel power asymmetry increases, the interests of the channel
partners diverge (Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp 1995) and it reduces the “structural
impediments inhibiting the more powerful firm’s opportunistic behavior” (Kumar, Scheer,
and Steenkamp 1995). Therefore increasing interdependence asymmetry reduces the trust
and commitment in the relationship as trust and commitment are not thought to flourish
in an asymmetric relationship (Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp 1995). Emerson (1962) in
his highly cited article also claimed that power asymmetry is inherently unstable as it
encourages the use of power. Therefore the weaker party always undertakes “balancing
operations” that reduce the power advantage. According to the bilateral deterrence theory
(Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp 1995) the weaker party knows that stronger party can
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take advantage of the situation therefore the weaker party tries to balance the power
asymmetry. It does so by reducing its own dependence by increasing the alternatives
available to it and/or by decreasing the value of its relationship with the partner. It can
also strive to increase its partner’s dependence by either increasing its own value to the
partner or by decreasing the partner’s alternatives (by say developing a monopoly over a
technology or a product).

From the above discussion it can be hypothesized that in the trade promotion context
when the target vendor is more powerful (retailer is more dependent) then it is possible
that the retailer could try and reduce its power imbalance by preferring the alternate
vendor, especially in situations when the short term economic value offered by both
vendors is the same.
While most of the literature would tend to agree with the previous statement, there is no
unanimity on the effect of power on behavioral commitment (Anderson, Lodish, and
Weitz 1987; Etgar 1976; Frazier 1983). Relative power theory (Kumar, Scheer, and
Steenkamp 1998) suggests that when a partner is less powerful then it would try to be as
inoffensive as possible to the stronger party so as not to incite punitive actions from the
stronger party. Therefore the weaker party would acquiescence to the stronger party. A
similar effect is also proposed by the conflict spiral theory (Kumar, Scheer, and
Steenkamp 1998) which proposes that when one party is clearly dominant, the less
dominant party avoids punitive actions against the stronger party as it realizes that the
gains from such actions is pretty low. Meaning, that increasing power asymmetry has a
positive impact on behavioral commitment on the part of the weaker party. Therefore it is
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possible that when the retailer is weaker than the vendor, the retailer would increase its
behavioral commitment towards the target vendor’s trade promotions. We believe that the
later view is more likely to prevail especially in a trade promotion scenario due to the fact
that a more dependent party knows that repeated attempts in dependence balancing could
lead to retaliation from the less dependent party. The weaker party also knows that since
the stronger party is less dependent on it, it increases the probability of punitive actions
(Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp 1998). We therefore hypothesize
H6: When the target vendor is more powerful than the retailer, the retailer would
increase its behavioral commitment to the target vendor’s trade promotions.
While so far we have talked about the main effects of power asymmetry on behavioral
commitment, in this section of the paper we will argue that power asymmetry also
moderates the effect of calculative and loyalty commitment on behavioral commitment.
Researchers (Brown, Lusch, and Nicholson 1995) have found that power asymmetry has
a moderating impact on retailer commitment and performance. According to them,
depending on the power asymmetry situation existing between the two parties’ different
sources of power (mediated vs. non-mediated power) is used by the one party and that
has differential impact on commitment generated in the other party. For example, when
the vendor is more powerful it is more likely to use mediated power that would lead to
more calculative commitment in the retailer. On the other hand, when power is
symmetric or when the retailer is more powerful, the generally accepted behavior is for
the vendor to use non mediated power which increases normative-commitment and
decreases instrumental or calculative commitment.
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Recalling our discussion previously on calculative and loyalty commitment, we can say
that while calculative commitment is considered fleeting in nature, loyalty commitment is
considered more permanent. While intermediaries high in calculative commitment seek
to develop alternatives, dealers with high affective commitment demonstrate a higher
willingness to stay and invest in the relationship (Kumar, Hibbard, and Stern 1994).
Kumar, Hibbard, and Stern (1994) also demonstrated that affective commitment to a
supplier by an intermediary has the strongest possible association with the beneficial
consequences of commitment followed by moral commitment and then only followed by
calculative commitment. Literature seems to suggest that when power asymmetry is not
taken into account, then affective or loyalty commitment has the greatest impact on
behavioral commitment only then followed by calculative commitment. Therefore we
propose that
H7: When the vendor is less powerful than the retailer then the retailer’s loyalty
commitment would be a stronger predictor of behavioral commitment towards the
target vendor’s trade promotions than the retailer’s calculative commitment.
However, the previous discussion also suggests that it might not be the case always and
that linkages between the different forms of commitment do vary across power
asymmetry conditions (Kumar, Hibbard, and Stern 1994). Wiener (1982) has suggested
that calculative commitment could make a stronger contribution to behavior especially in
cultural climates where there is a higher value on individual need gratifications and
rational thinking and less focus on the affective side of relationships.

Our goal here is to explain how buyers make the decision choice in the face of the
persuasion attempts being attempted by the vendors to accept their trade promotions. We
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use the Heuristic –Systematic model (Chaiken 1980; Eagly and Chaiken 1993) to
hypothesize the effect of power asymmetry on the choice process. The HSM model helps
researchers understand the choice process used by people. It tries to explain how people
process information about given risks that are manifest in each decision (Griffin et al.
2002). This model is one amongst the family of dual-process theories that explain choice
behavior (Chen, Duckworth, and Chaiken 1999).

The HSM model posits that there are two primary modes of information processing.
Systematic processing is effortful and involves a comprehensive scrutiny of all relevant
information to form judgments. It is a comprehensive analytical orientation to
information processing where the perceivers scrutinize a great deal of information before
making a judgment. Heuristic processing on the other hand is a cognitively less
demanding process and requires fewer cognitive resources than systematic processing.

Heuristic processing involves the use of extrinsic cues like source expertise and other
simple decision rules to formulate judgments and decisions (Eagly and Chaiken 1993;
Mitra 1995). Heuristics are learned on the basis of peoples past experiences and
observations. Thus people using heuristic process might make their choices based on the
previous encounters or shared experiences like reputations to make a decision.

The key assumption of the HSM model is that people are cognitive misers (Eagly and
Chaiken 1993; Taylor and Fiske 1978) who must be motivated to engage in systematic
processing. People thus want to satisfy their goal related needs in the most efficient way
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possible. This has also been labeled in the theory as the least effort principle, whereby
people often shun systematic processing in favor of the less effortful heuristic mode. The
next key principle of HSM is the sufficiency principle. The sufficiency principle states
that people will always try and satisfy their motivational concerns and minimize their
processing efforts (Griffin et al. 2002). What it means is that whenever people make a
choice they are always concerned about whether the choice they made is the right one, at
the same time if the choice is not important enough they do not want to spend much time
and effort on the choice. People would like to make only that much effort to ensure that
the choice that has sufficient validity.

Combining these two principles of least effort and sufficiency imply that people would
engage in greater amounts of systematic processing when the less effortful heuristic mode
does not provide sufficient judgmental confidence. When an issue is important enough it
motivates people to increase the desired level of judgmental confidence in the decision.
This level of confidence cannot be provided by heuristic processing thus people use
systematic processing. Eagley and Chaiken (1993) state that every person has a
sufficiency threshold and an actual confidence level, both of which lie in the judgmental
confidence continuum. Whenever the actual confidence level is higher than the
sufficiency threshold the sufficiency principle holds that systematic processing would
cease to operate. Although systematic processing requires greater cognitive resources it is
generally more effective in increasing subjective confidence than heuristic processing
(Chen, Duckworth, and Chaiken 1999).
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If people can be made to feel more accountable for their judgments or made to feel that
the consequences of a wrong judgment are severe then their sufficiency thresholds go up
and they can be expected to exhibit greater amount of systematic processing
(Maheswaran and Chaiken 1991). In other words if the motivation for a decision is high
enough the person would rather spend more effort in doing systematic processing than
going to the default option which is heuristic processing (Chen, Duckworth, and Chaiken
1999). It is well accepted in literature that when people are highly motivated, they
scrutinize message relevant information in detail and generate more message-relevant
thoughts (Kardes 1988; Petty, Cacioppo, and Schumann 1983). According to Eagley and
Chaiken (1993) among the many variables that increase motivation and foster more
systematic processing are task importance, responsibility for message evaluation and
accountability.

In the trade promotion scenario, when the retailer is faced with a more powerful vendor
which he doesn’t want to annoy, the retailer is motivated to think very carefully about the
likely consequences of the decision and the sufficiency threshold is likely to go up. To
ensure that a wrong decision is not made, the buyer is more likely to use systematic
processing to increase the confidence level in his choice. Therefore the buyer is more
likely to consider the costs and benefits of making the decision rather than relying solely
on heuristics like reputation of the vendor (Maheswaran, Mackie, and Chaiken 1992) or
the likeability of the vendor salesperson. A point to note here is that since the default
action of any buyer is to use heuristic processing, when the vendor is less powerful, the
retail buyer is not so much concerned about making a wrong judgment. Therefore he is
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more likely to use heuristic processing to make the decision. This kind of effect was
hypothesized in the previous hypothesis and also was based on previous empirical
literature. In the scenario where the vendor is more powerful we can therefore
hypothesize that:
H8: When the vendor is more powerful than the retailer then the retailer’s
calculative commitment would be a stronger predictor of behavioral commitment
towards the target vendor’s trade promotions than the retailer’s loyalty
commitment.
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CHAPTER 4
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DESIGN
This chapter describes the methodology used to test the hypotheses. This chapter
constitutes of three main sections. The first section explains the research setting and
research design, and the second section describes the operationalization of the measures
used. The last section will provide insight in the data collection methods used and the
sample characteristics.

Research Design
In our study the goal was to test the relationship between power asymmetry, two forms of
loyalty commitment and calculative commitment on behavioral commitment. The goal
was understanding the causal relationship between these variables. We used a scenario
based experiment to test our hypotheses. According to Trochim (2001) to establish
causality three conditions are required:
a) Covariation: The impendent and dependent variables must covary with each other
and the changes in the independent variable must lead to changes in the dependent
variable.
b) Temporal precedence: The change in the presumed causal variable must precede
the presumed effect.
c) No Plausible alternative explanation: The presumed cause must be the only
reasonable explanation for changes in the dependent variable.
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Compared to all approaches, experimental methods are the strongest in determining
causality in research, because of the strong internal validity of experiments (Trochim
2001). In an experiment we can effectively control for the effects of undesirable
extraneous variables. Also, we can maintain the temporal precedence of the independent
variables and manipulation of the independent variables allows us to observe the effects
of those variables on the dependent variable. High Internal validity in experiments allow
us to isolate the effects of the independent variables and allow us to measure their
impacts more precisely (Cook and Campbell 1979). Finally, since the independent
variables in an experiment are orthogonal to each other, the effects of each independent
variable can be compared to each other.

Experiments by their very nature are intrusive in nature and are contrived in an artificial
environment (Trochim 2001) therefore they are criticized for their lack of external
validity that limits its generalizability. However since our goal in this study is not to
report on how decisions are taken in real life but how our theory stands up to empirical
scrutiny, we felt that an experiment was the appropriate research methodology.

We devised the experiment using a 2x2x2x2 between subjects factorial design. The study
design include 2 Calculative Levels (high, null), 2 Organizational Commitment levels
(high, null), 2 Personal Commitment levels (high, null), and 2 Power Asymmetry levels
(Target vendor more powerful than the retailer, Target vendor less powerful than the
retailer). Sixteen different scenarios were created, one each for all the different levels of
manipulation. The scenario tried to provide a glimpse of a real world situation that
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respondents might face in a purchasing managers role and they were asked to respond to
the scenario in a manner similar to what they would in real life.

The research design is presented in Table 1.
Table 1: Experimental Design
Target Vendor A
Option

Power Asymmetry of
Target Vendor with
Retailer

Calculative
Commitment

Loyalty
commitment with
Sales person

Loyalty
commitment with
organization

1

Vendor More Powerful

High

High

High

2

Vendor More Powerful

High

High

Low

3

Vendor More Powerful

High

Low

High

4

Vendor More Powerful

High

Low

Low

5

Vendor More Powerful

Low

High

High

6

Vendor More Powerful

Low

High

Low

7

Vendor More Powerful

Low

Low

High

8

Vendor More Powerful

Low

Low

Low

9

Retailer more Powerful

High

High

High

10

Retailer more Powerful

High

High

Low

11

Retailer more Powerful

High

Low

High

12

Retailer more Powerful

High

Low

Low

13

Retailer more Powerful

Low

High

High

14

Retailer more Powerful

Low

High

Low

15

Retailer more Powerful

Low

Low

High

16

Retailer more Powerful

Low

Low

Low

The scenario presented to the respondents was that the retailer is faced with two vendors
who are providing an equal cash discount. The products being offered to the retailer are
local brands that are perfectly substitutable with each other. What it means is that
irrespective of what product is chosen, the overall sales of the retailer remain constant.
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The retail buyer is asked to make a choice between giving the entire order to one vendor
or distribute the order among the two vendors in any percentage he likes.

There was, however, one issue that needed to be resolved before we could test our
hypotheses. The issue was how to separate out the effect of power and calculative
commitment. As discussed before in the previous section, the way power has been
measured (using dependence of party A over Party B) is somewhat similar to the way
calculative commitment has been operationalized. Therefore if Party A is dependent on
Party B for say X units, then party A also is likely to lose X units if it breaks its
relationship and thus party A has X units worth of calculative commitment towards party
B. From the discussion it seems that due to the way it has been operationalized,
dependence (the proxy of power) and calculative commitment are not orthogonal to each
other. To find the real impact of these variables we made sure that our manipulations of
calculative commitment and power are conceptually separate from each other.

Solving Non-Orthogonality between Power and Calculative Commitment
First we acknowledge that the problem occurs due to the way power has been measured
in literature. Most empirical papers have measured power in terms of percentage of sales
contributed by a party (Frazier, Gill, and Kale 1989). The logic behind this approach is
the “dependence” criteria. If vendor A contributes 20% of your sales then you are
dependent on vendor A and the dependence can be measured as 0.2. Also since power is
considered to be equal to dependence (Emerson 1962), researchers would say that
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Vendor A has power of 0.2 over the retailer. Generally the availability of resources
outside the relationship is not incorporated in the measurement.

Now the problem of non-orthogonality of power and calculative commitment can be
explained by the following example. Suppose there are three parties, vendor A, vendor B
and retailer C. Retailer C does business with both Vendor A and Vendor B. Let us
assume that vendor A contributes 10% of retailer C’s sales and vendor B contributes 20%
of retailer C’s sales. Therefore Vendor A has 0.1 power over retailer C versus Vendor B
who has 0.2 power. From the above we can see that vendor B is more powerful and
retailer C has more to lose by terminating its relationship with vendor B than with vendor
A. Therefore retailer C will have more calculative commitment towards vendor B than
vendor A. What we have demonstrated so far is that if power is measured or manipulated
using only dependence then it also has an impact on the measurement of calculative
commitment. Retailer C’s use of calculative commitment towards vendor B will always
be positively associated with vendor B’s power over C. Therefore there is a confounding
between these two variables.

Similarly, power by itself has no impact on behavior. Taking the same earlier example,
even though vendor B is more powerful and contributes 20% of the entire sales of
Retailer C, we can’t predict whether Vendor B will be able to use power without
considering the effect of countervailing power that Retailer C might have on vendor B. If
for example Retailer C actually sells 50% of the entire sales of vendor B, then vendor B
is more dependent on retailer C than vice versa. Therefore when understanding the effect
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of power we have to look at the difference in power rather than the absolute level of
power.

We solve this problem in the following manner. Let’s take the same scenario with the
same three parties. However this time we add some annual sales numbers also.
i. Vendor A has sales of 100 billion
ii. Vendor B has sales of 10 billion
iii. Retailer C has sales of 10 billion
Now lets also assume that both vendor A and B make sales of 2 billion (20% of retailer
sales) each through Retailer C. Therefore Dca = Pac = 0.2 and Dcb = Pbc = 0.2 (retailer C
is dependent on A and B for sales of 20% each) (Emerson 1962).

Since the power of both the vendors on the retailer is the same we would expect that
retailer C would behave the same towards both parties equally. However before making
that kind of statement we have to also look at the asymmetry of power (Pac-Pca and PbcPcb) as that would be a better predictor of behavior that just power. Now Pca=0.02
(retailer C sells only 2% of the entire sales of vendor A and therefore vendor A is only
dependent on retailer for a value of 0.02) and Pcb = 0.2 (retailer C sells 20% of the entire
sales of vendor B). Therefore the power asymmetry between vendor A and retailer C
(Pac-Pca) is 0.18 and the power asymmetry between vendor B and retailer C (Pbc-Pcb) is
zero.
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Looking at the asymmetry of power we can say that Vendor A seems to have a
asymmetrical relationship with Retailer C while Vendor B has a symmetrical relationship
with Retailer C. We can thus make a logical conclusion that we are more likely to find
the effects of power in the relationship between A and C rather than B and C. Since
vendor A is much more powerful than retailer C especially when compared to vendor B,
the retailer C is going to be more careful how it deals with vendor A rather than vendor B.

To understand the intuition behind the math, consider only the relationship between
Vendor A and Retailer C. Vendor A’s power over Retailer C is 0.2 and Retailer C’s
power over vendor A is only 0.02. In this scenario we can see very clearly Vendor A is
more powerful than Retailer C. What we have done here is reduce the power that retailer
C has over Vendor A. We could have very well gone the other way and instead of
reducing the power of C over A, increased the power of Vendor A over Retailer C by
increasing the dependence of Retailer C on Vendor A. However the effects of increasing
dependence of C on vendor A are different from our preferred method. If we increase the
dependence of retailer C, then retailer C also has more to lose and it increases the
calculative commitment that retailer C feels towards Vendor A.

Now a doubt can be raised whether power still operates especially in situations where
there is no danger of relationships being broken. This seems to be especially true in the
trade promotion area, where even if a vendor’s trade promotion is not accepted it doesn’t
imply that the vendor would break up the relationship.
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Our answer to this doubt is that power still operates in such a scenario for two reasons.
First, since power is the ability to influence even if there is no immediate relationship
termination the weaker party knows that its dependence is more on the stronger party and
rejecting the stronger party even though it offers equal economic benefits, would signal to
the stronger party that the weaker party is not inclined to continue the relationship in the
long run and may switch partners if another party comes along. And because the stronger
party understands that it is stronger and is less dependent, repeated rejections would
invite retaliation in the long run.

Second, although there is no immediate danger of relationship termination if there is
asymmetry of power, it increases the probability of retaliation from the stronger party. In
our scenario Vendor A does much more business than Retailer C, therefore has a larger
punitive capability than Retailer C (Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp 1998). According to
these researchers the existence of punitive capability with one party is also able to
influence the actions of the weaker party.

The point to note in our manipulation is that Retailer C is equally dependent on both A
and B and therefore the maximum “calculative loss” that retailer C can endure is also the
same, meaning that if the retailer were to calculate the maximum loss that s/he might
incur by breaking the relationship with either vendor, s/he would be indifferent between
the two parties. Therefore the calculative commitment of the retailer is equal for both
vendor A and B. However the power asymmetry is different and we will still get the
impact of power.
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Furthermore if vendor B wants to increase its power it has only the one option. It has to
reduce its dependence on Retailer C by increasing sales to other retailers. Vendor B can
also make retailer C sell more of its product, but if its overall sales don’t increase then the
power symmetry will hold and vendor C will not be better off.

Overall it seems that in the special case when the retailer is equally dependent on two
vendors it is likely that the vendor with greater sales would be considered more powerful.
Therefore in our trade dealing scenario, if P&G (one of the biggest consumer products
companies) and another smaller vendor sells the same amount of products to a retailer
then the retailer would consider P&G to be more powerful even though they are equally
dependent on both.

In our experiment we create a scenario that has this kind of power imbalance between the
vendor(s) and the retailer, so that the measurement of calculative commitment is not
contaminated by manipulation of power asymmetry. In our manipulation, we also
incorporate the idea about the lack of availability of resources outside the relationship in
the instrument to strengthen the power manipulation. For example, in the scenario when
the vendor is more powerful not only will power asymmetry will be to its advantage, but
also it will be positioned as controlling a major market share. We can then manipulate
calculative commitment in the manner that we had defined earlier, namely that
calculative commitment looks more at the benefits that the relationship would bestow in
the future rather than the losses that might be incurred on leaving the relationship.
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Manipulations
The basic scenario as discussed before consisted of a situation facing a purchasing
manager. The purchasing manager is supposed to place an order for 5 million cases of
non branded bubble wraps. The purchase manger generally offers the deal to whichever
vendor has the biggest trade deal. However, in this month both the vendors are offering
the same trade deal. The purchasing manager has to decide, whether to split the offer or
provide the entire order to one party. In the different scenarios we manipulated power,
calculative commitment, affective commitment to salesperson and affective commitment
to the vendor organization. In the next few pages we describe how we achieved the
manipulation of the different constructs.
Manipulating Power
We manipulate power asymmetry by having two extreme manipulations. The first case is
when the target vendor is more powerful than the retailer and the second where the target
vendor is less powerful than the retailer. Since the retailer is supposed to choose between
the two vendors in the scenario we will have an alternate vendor who would be equally
powerful as the retailer and who would serve as the control group. Figure 2 provides the
schematic of how power asymmetry will be manipulated:
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Figure 2: Manipulation of Power Asymmetry
Sales: $1 billion

Sales: $1 billion

Vendor A
Total sales: $80 b

Vendor B
Total sales: $20 b
High Power Condition

Retailer C
Total Sales: $20 b

Sales: $1 billion

Sales: $1 billion

Vendor B
Total sales: $20 b

Vendor A
Total sales: $5 b
Low Power Condition

Manipulating Calculative Commitment
Calculative/instrumental commitment was manipulated by giving the user a high
instrumental condition versus a null instrumental condition. A scenario that was used was
that Vendor A (target vendor) is likely to give a year end bonus trade promotion for
meeting yearly targets. Plus in the view of the retail buyer, vendor A is going to launch a
new potential block buster product and it would introduce the product in only a few
stores. We would keep vendor B’s calculative commitment as null in both the cases to
serve as control group.

Manipulating personal commitment (Commitment to salesperson)
We manipulate the loyalty commitment of the retail buyer towards the salesperson by
using the manipulations used by Murry and Heide (1998). The high personal commitment
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factor used was: “The salesperson is a personal friend from your college days and had
gone out of the way to help you even when he was not working with the target vendor”
while the low factor was: “The salesperson is completely new to target vendor”. Since
vendor B would act like the control group, Vendor B would always have “The
salesperson is completely new” as its manipulation.
Manipulating Organizational Commitment
We manipulate the organizational loyalty commitment of the retail buyer by using one
item mentioned by Tellefsen and Thomas (2005). The high organizational commitment
factor was manipulated by the following statement: “Your company has been involved in
joint research and development with vendor A for the last 10 years and you personally
spearheaded this initiative with vendor A. You also have tremendous personal respect for
vendor A’s professionalism in business.”

The low manipulation was “You have started on the relationship with vendor A only in
the last 10 years”. As in the manipulation of personal commitment, vendor B would
always have “You have started on the relationship with vendor B only in the last 10
years”. All the manipulations used in the experiment are provided in Table 2 - 5. An
example of the scenarios used is provided in appendix A.
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Table 2: Manipulations used in the scenarios: power asymmetry
Power Asymmetry
High
Target Vendor

Low

Acme Bubble Company is a very big

Acme Bubble Company is a small $5

and powerful $80 billion dollar firm

billion dollar firm that you have been

that you have been doing business

doing business with for the last 15

with for the last 15 years which

years which controls only 5% of the

controls almost 80% of the entire

entire production of bubble wraps in

production of bubble wraps in the

the world.

world. Acme is considered a very
powerful company since Acme
literally sets the price for the entire
global market for bubble wraps and
hence Acme commands tremendous
respect in the business world. Acme
is also four times larger than your
company in terms of revenue.

Alternate vendor

Simons Bubble Co, is a much smaller

Simons Bubble Co, is a much smaller

$20 billion firm that has also been in

$20 billion firm that has also been in

the bubble wrap business for a long

the bubble wrap business for a long

time.

time.
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Table 3: Manipulations used in the scenarios – calculative commitment
Calculative Commitment
High
Target Vendor

Acme Bubble Company Likely to

Low
-- Null--

launch a new improved product in
the next few months and we might
get exclusive distribution (our market
research says that this will be a high
margin blockbuster)
Plus
Acme in the past has provided
year- end bonus trade
promotions for meeting yearly
targets

Alternate vendor

-- Null --

-- Null --

Table 4: Manipulations used in the scenarios – loyalty commitment to organization
Loyalty Commitment to Organization
High
Low
Target Vendor

Your company has been involved in

-- Null --

joint research and development with
Acme for the last 10 years and you
personally spearheaded this initiative
with Acme. You also have
tremendous personal respect for
Acme’s professionalism in business.

Alternate vendor

-- Null --

-- Null --
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Table 5: Manipulations used in the scenarios – loyalty Commitment to Vendor
Salesperson
Loyalty Commitment to Vendor Salesperson
High
Low
Target Vendor

You also really like Bob Jones who

Bob Jones is the new sales person

is the sales person from Acme and is

from Acme and you find him to be a

a personal friend from your college

very competent and honest man.

days. You have been dealing with
him even when he was not with
Acme. Bob is also a great
salesperson and in the past has gone
out of his way to do favors for you.
Plus
Your friend Bob made a personal
request that he needs this order.

Alternate vendor

The salesperson for Simons Bubble

The salesperson for Simons Bubble Co

Co is Tom White who was recently

is Tom White who was recently

appointed and you have found him to

appointed and you have found him to

be a decent and honest man.

be a decent and honest man.

Research Procedure

The first step in our research was to ensure that the experiment would allow us to do the
manipulations we wanted. For this we conducted two pretests. Both the pretests were
conducted with working MBA students, as we felt that working MBA students could act
as close proxies to our target respondent profile which was purchasing managers.
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Pretest 1
In our first pretest we choose two cells (cell 1 and cell 16) that contained all the
manipulations. In cell 1, all the manipulations of power, calculative commitment, loyalty
commitment to organization and loyalty commitment to sales person was HIGH. In cell
16 the manipulations of the above mentioned variables was low or neutral. The use of
these two cells allowed us to test in a single setting whether the all the manipulations
were working or not. 26 MBA students in a class room setting were recruited. All the
respondents were explained that we were conducting a study of purchasing managers and
that we wanted them to imagine themselves in the shoes of a purchasing manager and
answer all the questions the way in which they think a real purchasing manager would
behave. No other explanations were offered to the respondents. After all the respondents
had completed answering the instrument, the respondents were debriefed and the purpose
of the study was explained.

The data from the pretest was analyzed using SPSS 14. Since the focus of the pretest was
only to test whether the manipulations worked, we did not check the effect of the
impendent variables on the dependent variable. The first pretest showed that the power
manipulation was working properly. Respondents could see that vendor A was more
powerful than Vendor B, however we felt that the power asymmetry differences could be
increased even more. Respondents could not differentiate between the manipulations of
calculative commitment (F=3.854; sig=0.061). Similarly the manipulations of loyalty
commitment to organization were barely significant at the 0.5 alpha levels (F=4.20;
sig=0.052). The manipulations of loyalty commitment to vendor salesperson worked.
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To address the issue we rewrote the scenarios to make the manipulations stronger. To
increase the power difference, we added the following line to power manipulation.
“Acme is considered a very powerful company and controls 80% of the entire world
market. They literally set the price for bubble wraps”. To increase organization
commitment the following lines were added, “You have tremendous respect for Acme
and you have personally spearheaded a project with acme”. Finally to increase calculative
commitment, we added the following line “Acme might offer a year end bonus” The
changes made can be seen in table 6.
Table 6: Changes made in Manipulations after First Pretest
Independent
Variable
Power Assymetry

Original Manipulation

After Pretest

Acme Bubble Company is a very big

Acme Bubble Company is a very big

and powerful $80 billion dollar firm

and powerful $80 billion dollar firm

that you have been doing business with

that you have been doing business with

for the last 15 years which controls

for the last 15 years which controls

almost 80% of the entire production of

almost 80% of the entire production of

bubble wraps in the world.

bubble wraps in the world.
Acme is considered a very powerful
company since Acme literally sets the
price for the entire global market for
bubble wraps and hence Acme
commands tremendous respect in the
business world. Acme is also four
times larger than your company in
terms of revenue.

Calculative
Commitment

Likely to launch a new improved

Acme Bubble Company Likely to

product in the next few months and we

launch a new improved product in the

might get exclusive distribution (our

next few months and we might get

market research says that this will be a

exclusive distribution (our market

high margin blockbuster)

research says that this will be a high
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margin blockbuster)
Plus
Acme in the past has provided
year- end bonus trade
promotions for meeting yearly
targets

Organizational
Commitment

Your company has also been involved

Your company has been involved in

in joint research and development with

joint research and development with

Acme for last 10 years and you

Acme for the last 10 years and you

personally spearheaded this initiative

personally spearheaded this initiative

with Acme.

with Acme. You also have tremendous
personal respect for Acme’s
professionalism in business.

Personal
Commitment

You also really like Bob Jones who is

You also really like Bob Jones who is

the sales person from Acme and is a

the sales person from Acme and is a

personal friend from your college days.

personal friend from your college days.

You have been dealing with him even

You have been dealing with him even

when he was not with Acme. Bob is

when he was not with Acme. Bob is

also a great salesperson and in the past

also a great salesperson and in the past

has gone out of his way to do favors

has gone out of his way to do favors

for you.

for you.

Plus

Plus

Your friend Bob made a personal

Your friend Bob made a personal

request that he needs this order.

request that he needs this order.

Pretest 2
To test whether the modified manipulations worked, we did a second pretest. This time
we conducted the test with another batch of thirty seven executive MBA students. The
cells selected for testing were Cell 7 and Cell 12. These cells were selected because in
these cells the manipulation of loyalty commitment to vendor salesperson was kept
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constant. Like the first pretest, the respondents were asked to imagine themselves in the
role of purchasing managers and make their decisions accordingly. The respondents were
also offered a raffle for participating in the survey. The total raffle amount was kept to a
minimum ($50). At the end of the survey a small debriefing was done.

Like the first pretest we only used the data collected from the pretest for manipulation
checks. This time all the manipulations checks came out significant and we have
subsequently used the same manipulations in our final study.

Main Study Survey Administration
We decided to conduct the experiment electronically so as to enable purchasing managers
from all over the country to participate and also enable automatic data entry. Another
reason for deciding to use an electronic format was the expense of administering the
instruments using a paper and pen format. While we had some concerns about the
response rates obtained in online research, recent research suggests that there is not much
difference between the response rates of online and offline surveys (Roster et al. 2007)
therefore we decided to go ahead with this plan.

Since we had sixteen cells in all, we created sixteen versions of the instrument using a
professional survey creation tool on the internet. We used qualtrics.com as our survey
software. However the existence of the sixteen instruments created a problem. We could
mail only one link to our respondents. And we had to somehow allocate the respondents
to one of 16 conditions. To solve the problem we created two websites both hosted on
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Georgia State University web servers. Hosting the initial web-pages on GSU web servers
also allowed us to increase the legitimacy of the survey.

The first website was a simple link (www.education.gsu.edu/sma) that only served as a
redirecting website. The respondents were automatically transferred from the first
website to the second website which was based on asp programming. This second
website hosted the first page of the survey, included the instructions and had a link to the
IRB consent form (Appendix B). The website also performed a sorting function. It
automatically allocated the respondents to one of the 16 instruments which were hosted
on qualtrics.com web-servers. The allocation was done on a round-robin basis. The first
respondent was allocated to the first condition, the second to the second condition and so
on. The pattern repeated itself after 16 respondents. Figure 3 gives the schematic diagram
of the data collection method. This method allowed us to allocate the respondents quite
evenly amongst all the cells.
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Figure 3: Schematic Diagram of Survey Administration
http://education.gsu.edu/sma

ASP based Web-server
Respondent # 1Æ Cell 1
Respondent # 2Æ Cell 2
Respondent # 3Æ Cell 3
Respondent # nÆ Cell n
(Repeat every 16 respondents)

Qualtrics.com
Cell 1

Qualtrics.com
Cell 2

Qualtrics.com
Cell 3

Qualtrics.com
Cell n

Data Collection
To obtain maximum external validity for our research, we decided to exclusively target
purchasing managers. Initially we wanted to target only purchasing managers who work
in the retail industry to participate in our study. However we had to broaden our subject
profile for two reasons. First, since the goal of this dissertation research was theory
testing and the retail environment was only a context in which the theory was being
tested we felt confident that purchasing managers in other sectors would also be able to
identify themselves in such a scenario. The second reason for broadening the criteria was
the non availability of a specific sampling frame constituting purchasing managers
working in the retail industry.
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We decided to collect around 30 respondents per cell (Cohen 1992), so as to have enough
sample size to enable the experiment to provide us with usable and stable statistical
values. Because we had 16 cells, our targeted sample size therefore was 480 respondents.

Obtaining 480 respondents, who were in the purchasing managers’ role to participate in
our experiment, was a difficult task and we used the following strategies to generate
enough respondents. The effectiveness of the strategies is also provided along with the
strategies used.
1) Three advertisements in the electronic newsletter; Just in e-time published by the
Institute of Supply Chain Managers (ISM), which is the preeminent national
association of supply chain managers. Effectiveness: Nil
2) Running a keyword targeted web based ad campaign. We used Google adwords to
buy up specific keywords related to purchasing managers. The ads were shown in
continental USA, whenever someone searched using those keywords in Google’s
search engine. The ads used are shown in Appendix C. Effectiveness: Nil
3) Corporate support. We contacted a well known retail company to support this
research. The purchasing head agreed to participate in the research by distributing
the web link to the all the purchasing managers in the company. Effectiveness:
Low
4) Purchasing Managers Association support. Our initial goal was to convince ISM
(Institute of Supply Chain Managers) to support the research. The first attempt to
garner support failed. However we contacted all the affiliates at the state level.
We were successful in convincing NAPM -Georgia, ISM – Seven counties,
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NAPM – National Capital area, NAPM – Arizona, NAPM – Cincinnati and
CAPM (Connecticut Association of Purchasing Management) to support the
research. While NAPM-Georgia sent out emails to their members. The other
associations only put the link to our survey along with a basic introduction on
their main website. Effectiveness: Medium
5) We also used panel data sourced from a leading online panel company
(zoomerang.com). We requested a B2B panel consisting of only purchasing
managers. The role of the online panel company was limited to sending an email
to the purchasing managers in their panel with a link to our survey. The survey
was still hosted on our webservers. The incentive offered was a chance to win
$1000 USD. The incentive administration was handled by the panel management
company. Effectiveness: High
Using all these strategies we managed to generate overall 547 responses. We had to
delete 62 responses because of duplicate/ incomplete responses. In the end we were left
with 485 usable responses. We were thus able to get around 30 respondents per cells. The
break up of the responses in terms of the cells is given in Table 7. The break up of the
initial number of respondents in terms of the method used is given in Table 8.
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Table 7: Break up of Respondents per Cell
Loyalty
commitment
Calculative with sales
commitment person
High
High

Loyalty
commitment
with firm
High

2 High

High

High

Neutral

32

3 High

High

Neutral

High

31

4 High

High

Neutral

Neutral

29

5 High

Neutral

High

High

31

6 High

Neutral

High

Neutral

29

7 High

Neutral

Neutral

High

30

8 High

Neutral

Neutral

Neutral

32

9 Low

High

High

High

27

10 Low

High

High

Neutral

32

11 Low

High

Neutral

High

30

12 Low

High

Neutral

Neutral

30

13 Low

Neutral

High

High

30

14 Low

Neutral

High

Neutral

31

15 Low

Neutral

Neutral

High

31

16 Low

Neutral

Neutral

Neutral

30

Power of
Target
Scenario vendor
1 High

Total

# of
respondents
per cell
30

485
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Table 8: Number of respondents per method used
Method

Overall Response

1) Advertisements in ISM Newsletter

2

2) Keyword based ad campaign

0

3) Corporate support

3

4) Purchasing Management Association

159

support
5) Panel Membership

383

Total

547

Overall we can see that only the last two methods were effective. The total response rate
was calculated using the following method. A total of 4959 supply chain managers were
in the sample frame that was used. This sample frame is calculated by using Table 9
Table 9: Total sample frame
Sample source

Total Members

1) NAPM-GA

780

2) NAPM- Seven counties

139

3) NAPM- Arizona

500

4) NAPM - Cincinnati

540

5) NAPM – National Capital Area

400

6) CAPM (Connecticut Association of

600

Purchasing Management)
5) Panel Membership

2000

Total

4959

The raw response rate for the study was slightly around 10%. However a better way of
measuring the response rate would be to look at the number of people who initially went
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to the main website and after reading the purpose of the study agreed to actually complete
the study. This method is similar to the way how pen and paper survey research response
rates are calculated in B2B research. In that method researchers initially pre-qualify
respondents by calling a larger sample frame. People who agree to participate are then
sent the instrument. Response rates are calculated as number of people who actually
answer the survey with respect to the number of people who agreed to participate.

Similarly in our research while we did approach 4959 potential purchasing managers, not
all managers saw the invitation (most associations only posted the link on their website).
Of the 4959 managers approached, 1112 mangers actually clicked on the link to the first
page of the survey which explained the purpose of the study. Out of these 547 actually
completed the instrument. And of these 547 only 485 responses were usable. Therefore
our effective response rate according to this calculation is 43%.

Data Characteristics
In this section we explain the demographic characteristic of the data. We collected data
only from people who were in purchasing. We had good representation from both men
and women in the data. Out of 485 overall respondents we had 54.2% males. The break
up of the gender classification is given in table 10.
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Table 10: Gender classification of respondent sample
Classification

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

Male

263

54.2

54.8

Females

217

44.7

44.7

Missing

5

1.0

485

100%

Values
Total

100%

We also had a wide variety of experience represented in our sample. Respondents were
asked to indicate the extent of their total work experience. They were asked to classify
themselves in one of four groups. Overall it seems that most of our respondent sample
had enough work experience to justify inclusion in our study. The work experience
characteristics of the sample are provided in Table 11
Table 11: Work experience of respondent sample
Classification

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

Less than 5 years

23

4.7

4.8

5 to 10 years

50

10.3

10.4

11 to 15 years

61

12.6

12.7

More than 15

346

71.3

72.1

5

1

485

100%

years
Missing Values
Total

100%

We also asked the respondents to identify the industry that they represent. As can be seen
our respondents come from a wide variety of industries. The industry profile of the
sample is provided in table 12.
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Table 12: Industry classification of respondent sample
Classification

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

Retailing

51

10.5

10.6

Wholesale/Distribution

42

8.7

8.8

Utilities

13

2.7

2.7

Government

43

8.9

9.0

Health Services

36

7.4

7.5

Engineering/Research

10

2.1

2.1

Finance/ Banking /

9

1.9

1.9

Food Service

11

2.3

2.3

Service

8

1.6

1.7

Lodging

4

0.8

0.8

Transportation

29

6.0

6.0

Publishing

4

0.8

0.8

Communication

24

4.9

5.0

Construction

16

3.3

3.3

Education

29

6.0

6.0

Others

151

31.1

31.5

5

1.0

485

100%

Insurance

Missing Values
Total

100%

We also asked respondents to classify their job profiles. We used the most common
designations used in the purchasing area. The job profiles covered in our data is given in
Table 13.
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Table 13: Job profile classification of respondent sample
Classification

Frequency

Percent

Valid
Percent

Purchasing Manager

125

25.8

26.1

Purchasing Agent

91

18.8

19.0

Purchasing

39

8

8.1

Purchasing Director

27

5.6

5.6

VP of Purchasing

9

1.9

1.9

Materials Manager

20

4.1

4.2

Materials Director

7

1.4

1.5

Buying Coordinator

11

2.3

2.3

Purchasing Supervisor

17

3.5

3.5

VP of Materials

1

0.2

0.2

Assistant Purchasing

14

2.9

2.9

Buyer

68

14.0

14.2

Others

50

10.3

10.4

Missing Values

6

1.2

485

100%

Agent

Total

100%

We also had responses from purchasing managers who work in both large and small
companies. Table 14, gives the break up of the data in terms of the size of the company
that the respondents work for.
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Table 14: Classification of respondent company size
Classification

Frequency

Percent

Valid
Percent

Less than $50 million

187

38.5

39.3

$50 to $499.99 Million

85

17.5

17.8

$500 Million to $4.99

79

16.2

16.6

$5 to $19.99 Billion

54

11.1

11.3

20 Billion Plus

70

14.4

14.7

Missing Values

10

2

Total

485

100%

Billion

100%

Also 399 respondents out of the total 485 who completed the surveys voluntarily
provided their email address to get access of the results. Overall by looking at all the
demographic data we can be fairly confident that we have a balanced sample especially
when we consider that this is a hard to reach segment. We therefore decided to go ahead
with the analysis of the data.
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CHAPTER 5
DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
This chapter describes the data analysis used to test our hypothesis. This chapter contains
two main sections. The first section describes the analysis of the manipulation checks.
The second section describes the analysis of the main hypotheses.
Manipulation Checks Analysis
Before we started analyzing our data we did manipulation checks to ensure that our
independent variables were behaving the way they were supposed to. No experimental
study can work if the manipulation checks don’t work out. We did four basic
manipulation checks to ensure the integrity of our analysis.

Our first manipulated variable was calculative commitment. We had included two items
in the instrument to check for the manipulation effect of calculative commitment. The
means and the reliability of the items are given in table 15.

Table 15: Scale items – reliability – calculative commitment
Mean
Acme Bubble Co is more likely to
financially benefit your company in
the medium to long term.

4.52

Std.
Deviation
1.515

N

Cronbach’s
Alpha

482
0.809

Acme Bubble co is more likely to
provide financial gains in the near
future

4.51

1.410

482

Since the overall reliability (correlation in this case) of the scale was above 0.7 which is
the minimum recommended acceptable scale reliability (Nunnally 1978) we added up the
scale items to form a composite measure of calculative commitment. This composite
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measure was used for the manipulation check of calculative commitment. We used a
simple t test to test for mean differences. As can be seen in table 16, the manipulation
checks indicate that the manipulations were significantly different from each other.
Overall respondents did rate the high calculative commitment condition as higher than
the low calculative commitment condition.
Table 16: Manipulation check - calculative commitment

Calculative
commitment
Total

Conditions
High Calculative
Commitment

N
240

Mean
9.6833

Std.
Deviation

Std.
Error
Mean

2.65596

T Value

.17144
5.456

Low Calculative
Commitment

242

8.3884

2.55357

Sig

0.00

.16415

The second manipulated variable was loyalty commitment towards the organization. We
had put two manipulation check items to test that loyalty commitment towards the
organization was being manipulated in the right manner. The reliability (correlation) of
the composite scale formed by the two items was 0.733 (table 17).

Table 17: Scale items – reliability – loyalty commitment to organization
Mean
The relationship with Acme is more
established and important than the
relationship with Simmons

3.80

Std.
Deviation

1.639

N

Chronbach’s
alpha

483
0.733

You are more likely to have a soft
corner for Acme as compared to
Simmons

4.13

1.686

483
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Like the earlier manipulation, we used a simple t-test to check for mean differences. As
seen in table 18, we can clearly see that the manipulation worked. Respondents in high
affect for the organization manipulation condition did feel differently from respondents in
the low manipulation setting and the effect was significant.
Table 18: Manipulation check- loyalty commitment to organization

Loyalty to
organization
Total

Conditions
High Affect for
Organization

N
240

Mean

Std.
Deviation

8.5583

2.85726

Std.
Error
Mean

T Value

.18444
4.735

Low Affect for
Organization

243

7.3128

2.92342

Sig

0.00

.18754

The next manipulated independent variable that was tested was loyalty commitment to
the vendor salesperson. This variable was tested using a non parametric measure, because
of the way the manipulation was done. We manipulated the loyalty towards the
salesperson in the scenario by showing that the retailer (the respondent in this case) has a
friendship towards the salesperson of the target vendor. In our case the sales person of the
target vendor was called Bob Jones. In the low Loyalty towards the salesperson condition,
the respondent was supposed to identify both the target vendor’s sales person, “Bob
jones” and the other vendor’s sales person “Tom white” as equal to each other. Therefore
the manipulation would be considered workable if in the High “loyalty commitment to
the salesperson” condition a majority of the respondents choose “Bob Jones” as “The
vendor salesperson they are more likely to feel a strong liking for”. Similarly in the low
“Loyalty commitment to the salesperson” condition, the majority of the respondents
should chose “Both are same” as the preferred value.
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Since the values were not collected as continuous variables and are non-parametric in
nature we use chi-square tests for doing the manipulation tests. Table 19 below gives the
values for the Chi-square tests.
Table 19: Manipulation check: calculative commitment towards vendor salesperson
Conditions
No affect for
Salesperson

High affect
for
Salesperson

Choice
Bob Jones
Tom White
Both are same
Total
Bob Jones
Tom White
Both are same
Total

Observed
N

Expected
N

Chi-square

Df

sig

Residual

29

80.3

13

80.3

-51.3
-67.3

199

80.3

118.7

136

80.7

55.3

14

80.7

-66.7

92

80.7

11.3

264.531

2

0.000

94.645

2

0.000

241

242

It is very clear from the above table that when we manipulated loyalty towards the target
vendor’s salesperson (Bob Jones) it worked the way it was supposed to work. Also in the
null condition majority of the people considered their affect for both the salespersons to
be same.

The final variable that was manipulated was power difference between the target vendor
and the retailer. In the manipulation we wanted three effects to take place.
a) In the High Power condition – The target vendor must be considered more
powerful than the retailer when compared to the low power condition.
b) In The High Power condition- The target vendor must also be considered more
powerful than the second alternate vendor.
c) In all conditions the second vendor must be considered equally powerful to the
retailer.
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To fulfill all these conditions we had devised three tests to ensure that the power
manipulation was working exactly as we planned.

The first manipulation check was done by asking the following question to all the
respondents “Acme Bubble Co (target vendor) can be considered more powerful than
your company”. Therefore if our manipulation works, respondents should agree to this
statement in the high power situation compared to the low power situation. Table 20
gives the mean values and the t-test for both the situations.

Table 20: Manipulation check: power of target vendor vis-à-vis the retailer

Acme Bubble
Co can be
considered
more powerful
than your
company

Choices Power
Vendor More
Powerful

N

Mean

242

4.70

Std.
Deviation

1.615

Std.
Error
Mean

T Value

Sig

.104
15.904

Vendor Less
Powerful

241

2.54

1.369

0.00

.088

As can be seen in the above table, when we manipulate the target vendor to be more
powerful the mean is 4.70 while in the situation when the vendor is considered less
powerful the mean in only 2.54. Since the scale is anchored on strongly agree (7)/
strongly disagree (1). It means that when we manipulated the target vendor to be more
powerful, the respondents agreed with the statement and when we manipulated the target
vendor to be less powerful, the respondents disagreed with the given statement.
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The second manipulation check was done by asking the following question “Acme
Bubble Co (target vendor) can be considered more powerful than Simons Bubble Co
(alternate vendor).” This question was asked as according to our manipulation, not only
should the target vendor be considered more powerful than the retailer in the high power
manipulation but also should be considered more powerful than the alternate vendor and
vice-versa. Therefore the manipulation has worked if in the high power manipulation
respondents agree to the statement and in the low power statement they disagree with the
statement and this difference is significant. Table 21 gives the mean values and the t-test
to check the validity of the manipulation.

Table 21: Manipulation check: power of target vendor vis-à-vis the alternate vendor

Acme Bubble Co
can be considered
more powerful than
Simons Paper Co.

Power
Vendor
More
Powerful
Vendor
Less
Powerful

N
242

Mean

Std.
Deviation

Std. Error
Mean

5.64

1.559

.100

T Value

21.616
241

2.66

1.470

Sig

0.000

.095

As clearly seen in the above table under high power manipulation, the target vendor is
considered more powerful than the alternate vendor (mean 5.64) and in the low power
situation the target vendor is considered less powerful than the alternate vendor.

The third manipulation check on power was done by utilizing Emerson’s (1962) power =
dependence formulation. According to Emerson, power asymmetry exists when one party
is more dependent on the other party. To ensure that we were following Emerson’s
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guidelines with respect to how power was conceptualized and to make sure that our third
condition “The second vendor is considered equally powerful to the retailer” we asked
three manipulation check questions to all the respondents. Since the questions were asked
in an agree/disagree format we use chi-square analysis to test that the manipulation is
working the way it is supposed to be.

The first two manipulation checks are given in Table 22 and Table 23
Table 22: Manipulation check: power=dependence for target vendor -1

Your
Company is
more
dependent on
Acme than
Acme is
dependent on
your company

Power
Vendor
More
Powerful

Vendor
Less
Powerful

Observed
N
Agree
Disagree

Expected
N

Residual

158

121.5

36.5

85

121.5

-36.5

Total

243

Agree

29

120.5

-91.5

Disagree

212

120.5

91.5

Total

241

Chisquare

Df

Sig

21.930

1

0.00

138.959

1

0.00

Table 23: Manipulation check: power=dependence for target vendor -2

Acme is more
dependent on
your
Company
than your
company is
dependent on
Acme

Power
Vendor
More
Powerful

Vendor
Less
Powerful

Observed
N

Expected
N

Residual

46

121.5

-75.5

Disagree
Total

197
243

121.5

75.5

Agree

198

120.5

77.5

Disagree
Total

43
241

120.5

-77.5

Agree

Chisquare

Df

Sig

93.831

1

0.00

99.689

1

0.00

As can be clearly seen in table 22, we asked the respondents if they thought their
company was more dependent on the target vendor than vice versa. If our manipulation
works then respondents should agree to the statement in the high power situation and
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disagree with the same statement in the low power situation. Table 22 suggests that
respondents did exactly as we anticipated they would do.

We also asked the same question in a reverse manner as seen in table 23 to check that the
response to the first manipulation check was a true understanding of the situation. In this
question we asked if the respondents thought that the target vendor was more dependent
on their company than vice versa. The manipulation now works if the respondents
disagree with the statement in the high power manipulation and agree to the statement in
the low power condition. As can be seen in table 23 we find full support for our
manipulation here.

Our final manipulation check concerned how the alternate vendor is perceived by the
respondents. The alternate vendor was named Simmons Bubble Company and our
manipulation intended Simmons’ to be considered equally powerful to the retailer. And
since power is defined as equal to dependence, we asked if the respondents considered
Simmons to be equally dependent on the retailer as the retailer is dependent on Simmons.
We expected that respondents would agree to the statement in both the High Power and
Low power manipulation situation. As can be seen in Table 24, we found support for our
manipulation.
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Table 24: Manipulation check: power=dependence for alternate vendor

Your
company is
equally
dependent on
Simmons as
Simmons is
dependent on
your company

Power
Vendor
More
Powerful

Vendor
Less
Powerful

Observed
N

Expected
N

Residual

Agree

167

121.5

45.5

Disagree
Total

76
243

121.5

-45.5

Agree

152

120.5

31.5

Disagree
Total

89
241

120.5

-31.5

Chisquare

Df

Sig

34.078

1

0.0

16.469

1

0.0

From the above discussion we can see that all our manipulations worked exactly as we
intended them to. However before going on to hypothesis testing we wanted to do some
more tests to ensure the validity of our results.

Panel vs Non Panel Data
As mentioned earlier we collected data from two basic sources. While we obtained some
data from purchasing managers who were reached via their associations, a large chunk of
the data was obtained from a panel. It is possible that that since the panel consists of
people who have agreed to answer surveys in return for some personal gain there might
exist some bias in terms of their responses. We wanted to make sure that the bias should
not be affecting the results of this study. Since we had a reasonable number of responses
from non panel members we were able to test if there was any difference in how the
panel members respond versus the non-panel members. We therefore conducted a simple
t-test of their responses to our dependent variable. The results are shown in table 25.
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Table 25: Panel vs. non-panel difference test

Dependent variable
Behavioral
commitment: Percent
order to the target
vendor

Mean

Std.
Error
Mean

Std.
Deviation

Panel
Yes

N
349

59.9513

22.60367

1.20995

No

132

59.4318

20.21155

1.75919

T-Value

Sig

0.231

0.817

As can be seen from table 25 there is no significant difference between the means of the
panel and the non panel members. Therefore we can be confident of merging the
responses of the both these groups when analyzing our data.
Non Response bias
Good research demands that we test for non- response bias in our sample. The accepted
method for testing for non-response bias is by dividing the data into early and late
responses and looking at the mean differences between the two groups (Armstrong and
Overton 1977). The results of the test are provided in table 26
Table 26: Early vs late respondents difference test

Dependent Variable
Behavioral
commitment: Percent
order to the target
vendor

Phase
Early
Respondents
Late
respondents

N

Mean

Std.
Deviation

Std.
Error
Mean

283 60.3110

21.76589

1.29385

198 59.0909

22.25491

1.58159

T-Value

0.599

Sig

0.549

As we can see from table 26 the two groups are not very different from each other in
terms of their response to our final dependent variable.
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Scenario Realism
We conducted another test to look at the scenario realism. Since the study was aimed at
understanding the behaviors of purchasing managers and we had asked them to imagine
themselves in a scenario devised by us. We wanted to know how likely it was that such a
scenario happened in real life business situations. We had an item in the instrument
which asked the following question “In your opinion how often does the scenario
described above occurs in practice (meaning two vendors who offer the same trade deal
and you are forced to make a choice)”. The choices were anchored on very often (7) to
very rarely(1).
Table 27 gives the descriptive scores on this item by all the respondents in the sample.

Table 27: Scenario realism score
N
In your opinion how
often does the scenario
described above occurs
in practice (meaning two
vendors who offer the
same trade deal and you
are forced to make a
choice)

479

Minimum

Maximum

1

7

Mean

4.35

Std. Deviation

1.729

From the table we can see that the mean score (4.35) is more than 3.5 which is the mid
point value. Therefore the scenario is not totally unknown to the respondent population.
However to ensure greater external validity we ran the same analysis for all respondents
who work in the retail sector, since the scenario was based in the retail sector. The results
of the analysis can be seen in table 28. We get similar mean scores as compared to the
overall sample. Therefore we can be reasonably sure about the validity of our
experimental scenario as being relevant to practicing managers.
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Table 28: Scenario realism score - retail industry purchase manager
N
In your opinion how
often does the scenario
described above occurs
in practice (meaning two
vendors who offer the
same trade deal and you
are forced to make a
choice)

51

Minimum

Maximum

1

7

Mean

4.20

Std. Deviation

1.662

a Please check the industry which best describes the company you work in = Retailing

Since all of the checks were successful, we feel confident about going for hypothesis
testing. In the next section we discuss the methods used for testing our hypotheses and
the results of our study.

Hypothesis testing
We used dummy coded regression to test all our hypotheses. According to (Pedhazur
1997) dummy coded multiple regression is considered a more comprehensive and general
approach to data analysis because all variables are viewed from the same frame of
reference. It is even more appropriate when the attempt is to explain or predict a
dependent variable (Pedhazur 1997). Further more multiple regressions provide us with
path coefficients that tell us about the strength of the antecedent variables. Pedhazur
(1997) also suggest using multiple regression over anova when cell frequencies in a
factorial design are unequal and disproportionate. Although some researchers disagree
and claim that ANOVA is robust to violations of unequal cell size (Lindman 1974)

In our study the goal was to look at the how the antecedent variables were influencing the
dependent variable. Furthermore since some of our hypotheses hypothesized about the
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strength of antecedent variables as compared to others in different situations, we
considered multiple regression as the appropriate technique to use.

Main and initial interaction effects
The first goal was to test the main effects of our independent variables. Our main and
only dependent variable was behavioral commitment of the retailer towards the target
vendor and it was operationalized as the percent of the order provided to the target
vendor. Hypothesis 1 through 4 and 6 were tested by regressing behavioral commitment
on power asymmetry, calculative commitment, loyalty commitment to salesperson and
loyalty commitment to firm. Hypotheses 5a and 5b were tested by including an
interaction term in the equation. We included an interaction term so that we could test for
the moderation effect (Sharma, Durand, and Gur-Arie 1981) of calculative commitment
on loyalty to the organization and loyalty to the salesperson. The following overall model
was tested:
Y = a1 +b*x1 + c*x2 + d*x3 +e*x4 + f*(x2*x3) + g *(x2*x4) + error ---- (i)
Where:
Y = Retailer’s behavioral commitment to the target vendors trade promotion
x1= Power asymmetry between the retailer and the target vendor
x2= Retailer’s calculative commitment towards the target vendor
x3= Retailer’s personal commitment to the target vendors salesperson
x4 = Retailer’s organizational commitment to the target vendor
Table 29 provides the results of the main regression equation
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Table 29: Main effects regression equation - I

Model
1

Dependent Var:
Behavioral
Commitment
(% order to Target
vendor)
(Constant)
Power (x1)
Cal_Commit (x2)
Loy_Salesp (x3)
Loy_Org (x4)
Cal_Commit
x_Loy_sales
Cal_Commit
x_Loy_org
R = 0.373

Unstandardized
Coefficients
B
52.048
-9.046
15.680
5.500
7.283

Std. Error
2.460
1.869
3.240
2.641
2.641

-3.322
-4.347

Standardized
Coefficients
t

Beta

Sig.

-.206
.357
.125
.166

21.155
-4.839
4.839
2.083
2.758

.000
.000
.000
.038
.006

3.740

-.066

-.888

.375

3.740

-.085

-1.162

.246

R2 =0.139

From table 29 we can see that many of the hypotheses were supported. The main model
explained 13.9% (R2) of the overall variance in the dependent variable. Hypothesis H1
which concerned the effect of calculative commitment of the retailer on the behavioral
commitment shown by the same retailer would be supported if c is positive and
significant. As can be seen from table 29, calculative commitment does have a positive
and significant impact. (B=15.680; sig 0.00) on behavioral commitment. We therefore
find support for hypothesis H1.

In this equation we did not test the combined effect of loyalty commitment on behavioral
commitment. Instead this equation tests for the separate effects of the two forms of
loyalty commitment. Hypothesis H3 and H4 would be confirmed if loyalty commitment
towards the vendor salesperson (d) and loyalty commitment towards the organization (e)
have a positive and significant effect of behavioral commitment. As can be seen from
table 29, Loyalty to vendor salesperson has a positive and significant effect (B=5.5;

113

sig=0.038) therefore we find support for hypothesis H3. Loyalty to vendor organization
also has a positive and significant effect (B=7.283; sig=0.006). Thus we find support for
H4 also.

Hypotheses H5a and H5b were about testing the interaction effect of loyalty commitment
to vendor salesperson and loyalty commitment to vendor organization with calculative
commitment. According to the two hypotheses the effect of calculative commitment on
behavioral commitment decreases in the presence of the two variables. Therefore if f and
g (equation - i) have negative signs and are significant we would have support for
hypothesis H5a and H5b respectively.

From the table we see that both these hypotheses are not supported. For H5a (B=-3.322;
sig= 0.375), increased personal commitment of the retailer towards the target vendors
salesperson does decrease the positive effect that calculative commitment has on
behavioral commitment, since the beta value is definitely negative, however the effect is
not strong enough and it is not significant.

Similarly for H5b (B= - 4.347; Sig= 0.246), increased organization commitment of the
retailer towards the target vendor does decrease the positive effect that calculative
commitment has on behavioral commitment since the beta value is again negative,
however the effect is not strong enough and therefore not significant.

Hypothesis H6 was formulated to explain the effect of power asymmetry on behavioral
commitment. According to Kumar, Scheer and Steenkamp’s (1998) relative power theory,
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the weaker and more dependent parties always agree with the stronger party to prevent
punitive action. Anecdotal evidence also suggests that when vendors are more powerful,
the retailers increase the behavioral commitment to that vendor’s trade promotion.
However our study found very contrary evidence. From Table 29 we can clearly see that
while power does have a significant impact on behavioral commitment (B= -9.046;
Sig=0.00) the direction of the effect is opposite to the one we had hypothesized.
Therefore we fail to find support for Hypothesis H6.

Even though our hypothesis failed, we know that this directional effect was actually
hypothesized by Emerson (1962) who theorized that because power asymmetry is
inherently unstable, the weaker parties always undertakes balancing operations for
reducing the power advantage. A similar effect was also hypothesized by bilateral
deterrence theory (Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp 1995) whereby the weaker party tries
to balance power asymmetry. Our study actually provides empirical proof for both the
theories.

Hypothesis H2 was formulated to test the effect of loyalty commitment of the retailer on
the behavioral commitment shown by the same retailer. This loyalty commitment
variable was a comprehensive construct not divided into its two facets of loyalty to the
organization and loyalty to the salesperson. To test hypothesis H2 we had to do some data
manipulation.
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We start by recoding x3 and x4 and creating another variable m1. Where m1 = 1 when
both x3 and x4 = 1and m1=0 when both x3 and x4 =0. What this recoding means is that
the retailer has high overall loyalty commitment to the target vendor when both
organizational commitment and loyalty commitment to salesperson are high and that
there is no loyalty commitment only when personal commitment to salesperson and
organizational commitment are both absent. We would ignore situations where only one
of the two types of loyalty commitment is high. We will thus consider only the extreme
conditions to test the hypothesis. The regression equation that would be estimated is:

Y= a2 + b1* x1 + c1 * x2 + d1* m1 + error ------ (ii)
Where:
x1 = Power asymmetry between the retailer and the target vendor
x2= Retailer’s calculative commitment towards the target vendor
m1= Retailer’s Loyalty commitment to the target vendor

The results of the regression are presented in table 30.
Table 30: Main effects regression equation - II

Model

1

Dependent Var:
Behavioral
Commitment
(% order to Target
vendor)
(Constant)
Power (x1)
Cal_Commit (x2)
Loyalty_Commit
(m1)
R =0.396

Unstandardized
Coefficients
Std.
B
Error

56.762
-12.219
8.892

2.635
2.658
2.658

9.052

2.658

Standardized
Coefficients

t

Sig.

Beta

-.277
.201

21.539
-4.597
3.346

.000
.000
.001

.205

3.406

.001

2

R =0.157
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As can be seen in table 30, loyalty commitment has a significant and positive effect
(B=9.052; Sig=0.00) on behavioral commitment. We therefore find support for H2.

Hypothesis H7 and H8 (where the aim is to test the moderating effect of power
asymmetry on behavioral commitment), were tested by dividing the data into two
subgroups, one where the vendor is more powerful and another where the retailer is more
powerful. Two regressions were carried out with the dependent variable as behavioral
commitment and the independent variables being calculative commitment and overall
loyalty commitment. The different beta weights obtained enable us to test both the
hypotheses. The equations in standardized form would be

Y1 = β1* x2 + β2 * m1 + error ---- (iii)
Y2 = β3* x2 + β4 * m1 + error ---- (iv)
Where
x2= Retailer’s calculative commitment towards the target vendor
m1= Retailer’s overall loyalty commitment to the target vendor
and
Equation (iii) is estimated for the group where the target vendor is less powerful than the
retailer and
Equation (iv) is for the group where the target vendor is more powerful than the retailer.
The table 31 and table 32 provide the results of the two regressions.
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Table 31: Moderating effects regression: vendor less powerful
Dependent Var:
Behavioral
Commitment
(% order to Target
vendor)

Unstandardized
Coefficients
Std.
B
Error
1
(Constant)
57.930
3.175
Cal_Commit
7.307
3.699
Over_loyalty
8.241
3.699
R=0.265
R2= 0.07
b Power = Vendor Less Powerful
Model

Standardized
Coefficients

t

Sig.

Beta
.178
.201

18.245
1.976
2.228

.000
.051
.028

Table 32: Moderating effects regression: vendor more powerful
Dependent Var:
Behavioral
Commitment
(% order to
Target vendor)

Unstandardized
Coefficients
Std.
B
Error
1
(Constant)
43.438
3.289
Cal_Commit
10.405
3.841
Over_loyalty
9.777
3.840
R= 0.327
R2= 0.107
b Power = Vendor More Powerful
Model

Standardized
Coefficients

t

Sig.

Beta
.237
.222

13.206
2.709
2.546

.000
.008
.012

Researchers (Burns and Bush 2006; Green, Tull, and Albaum 1988) suggest that when
we want to make a statement about which independent variable has a bigger impact on
the dependent variable, we should compare the beta weights (β) rather than the
unstandardized coefficients. β-coefficients have the advantage of being directly
comparable in relative importance of their effects on Y (Green, Tull, and Albaum 1988).
These are regression coefficients that we get if we were to convert all independent and
dependent variables to z-scores before doing the regression. It implies the effect that one
standard deviation increase in the independent variable has on the standard deviation in
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the predicted variable, while keeping all other variables constant in the regression model
(Chen et al. 2006).

Looking at table 31, we see that β2 > β1 and while the standardized beta weight β2 is
significant at apha=0.05 levels; β1 is significant at alpha = 0.1 level (β2=0.201; sig =
0.028 and β1=0.178; sig=0.051). Therefore when the vendor is less powerful than the
retailer, it seems that the retailer’s overall loyalty commitment is a stronger predictor of
behavioral commitment than the retailer’s calculative commitment which agrees with our
hypothesis (H7).

Similarly for H8 (table 32) we see that β3 > β4 and all the standardized beta weights are
significant (β3=0.237; sig=0.008 and β4=0.222; sig=0.012). Therefore again as before it
seems that when the vendor is more powerful than the retailer, the retailers calculative
commitment is a stronger predictor of behavioral commitment than the retailers overall
loyalty commitment, giving support to H8.
Table 33: Effects of different forms on commitment on behavioral commitment
Dep: Behavioral
Commitment
Calculative
Commitment
Loyalty
commitment

High Power

Low Power

Asymmetry (β)

Asymmetry (β)

0.237

0.178

0.222

0.201

We find that under different power asymmetry conditions the effects of calculative
commitment and loyalty commitment on behavioral commitment are different (table 33)
and flip in terms of their strength. This is exactly as hypothesized by using the HSM
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model and allows us to claim that under low power situations loyalty commitment is a
stronger predictor than calculative commitment and under high power situation,
calculative commitment is a stronger predictor than loyalty commitment.

The complete summary of the hypotheses and the results are provided in figure 4 and
table 34 .

Figure 4: Final Model with Results: Retailer Commitment Model
Power Asymmetry between
Retailer and Vendor

Retailers Calculative
Commitment with Vendor

Retailers Affective
Commitment with Vendor
Salesperson

Behavioral Commitment
of Retailer towards
Vendor’s trade promotion

Retailers Affective
Commitment with Vendor
Organization
Significant
Loyalty commitment

Not Significant
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Table 34: Hypotheses and results summary
Hypothesis
H1: Increased calculative commitment of the retailer with the
target vendor would increase the overall behavioral commitment
that the retailer demonstrates towards the target vendor’s trade
promotions.

Result
Supported

H2: Increased loyalty commitment of the retailer with the target
vendor would increase the overall behavioral commitment that
the retailer demonstrates towards the target vendor’s trade
promotions.

Supported

H3: Increased organizational commitment of the retailer towards
the target vendor would increase the overall behavioral
commitment that the retailer demonstrates towards the target
vendor’s trade promotion.

Supported

H4: Increased personal commitment of the retailer towards the
target vendor’s salesperson would increase the overall
behavioral commitment that the retailer demonstrates towards
the target vendor’s trade promotions.

Supported

H5a: Increased organizational commitment of the retailer
towards the target vendor would decrease the positive effect that
calculative commitment has on the behavioral commitment of
the retailer towards the target vendor’s trade promotions

Partially Supported
Direction as
hypothesized, β Not
significant

H5b: Increased personal commitment of the retailer towards the
target vendor’s salesperson would decrease the positive effect
that calculative commitment has on the behavioral commitment
of the retailer towards the target vendor’s trade promotions.

Partially Supported
Direction as
hypothesized, β Not
significant

H6: When the target vendor is more powerful than the retailer,
the retailer would increase its behavioral commitment to the
target vendor’s trade promotions.

Not Supported.
Significant effect but
in opposite direction

H7: When the vendor is less powerful than the retailer then the
retailer’s loyalty commitment would be a stronger predictor of
behavioral commitment towards the target vendor’s trade
promotions than the retailer’s calculative commitment.
H8: When the vendor is more powerful than the retailer then the
retailer’s calculative commitment would be a stronger predictor
of behavioral commitment towards the target vendor’s trade
promotions than the retailer’s loyalty commitment.

Supported

Supported

121

CHAPTER 6
DISCUSSION AND CONTRIBUTIONS
This chapter consists of four main parts. In the first part we will discuss the results
obtained from the study. We will also discuss the implications of the results and compare
it with previous research. In the second part we will discuss the contributions of this
study in terms of theory, methodology and practice. The third part of this chapter would
discuss in brief the future directions for extending this research and finally we will
discuss the weakness of this study and possible ways in which they could be rectified/
improved upon in future studies.

Discussion of Results
As discussed in the previous chapter we found full or partial support for most of our
hypotheses. However we did get some surprises which were contrary to our hypotheses.
The interesting part was that these non supported results actually gave support to
alternate theories. In this section we will first discuss the main effects and then the results
for the interaction effects. And finally we will discuss how this study compares with
previous studies and how it adds to our understanding of the phenomenon under study.

Main Effect – Role of the Different forms of Commitments
In this research we tested the main effects of two different kinds of commitment on
behavioral commitment. In the case of calculative commitment we found support for the
view that calculative commitment, especially instrumental or forward looking calculative
commitment has a positive impact on behavioral commitment. We therefore could clarify
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and add insight to the controversy whether calculative commitment has a positive or
negative impact on behavior (Kumar, Hibbard, and Stern 1994). Since in this research we
were able to keep negative cognitive commitment or locked-in continuance commitment
(Sharma, Young, and Wilkinson 2006; Stebbins 1970) as constant through the use of
experimental techniques, we could tease out the effect of this variable. It is pertinent to
note here that calculative commitment as defined in literature is so alike to the definition
of dependence that the effects that are hypothesized are also similar to the ones for
dependence balancing as theorized by (Emerson 1962).

We also found support for the main effect that loyalty commitment has on behavioral
commitment. This result was expected as most scholars do believe that loyalty has a very
important effect on behavior (Morgan and Hunt 1994). Kumar, Hibbard, and Stern (1994)
had claimed that affective commitment does have a big impact on dealers willingness to
invest in relationships. Our research gives credence to the findings of these scholars.

Moderating Effect – Role of the Different forms of Commitments
We had hypothesized that personal commitment and organizational commitment actually
reduce the positive impact of calculative commitment. We did not find support for our
hypothesis. Although we did see that the direction of the effect was as hypothesized, it
was not a strong enough effect. In simple terms it means the different forms of loyalty
commitment cannot substitute or replace the strong effect that calculative commitment
has on decision making.
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Moderating Effect – Role of Power asymmetry on different forms of
commitment
An interesting finding of this research is the role played by power asymmetry in
determining the effect the different forms of commitment has on behavioral commitment.
Kumar, Hibbard, and Stern (1994) had demonstrated that affective commitment has the
strongest positive association with the beneficial consequences of commitment followed
by moral commitment and only then by calculative commitment.

We found that Kumar, Hibbard, and Stern (1994) may be right only when the vendor is
considered less powerful. On the other hand when the vendor is more powerful,
calculative commitment seemed to have a bigger impact. Therefore this study added to
our understanding of how commitment works on relationships in different scenarios.
Research Contributions
Theoretical contributions
This research makes four theoretical contributions to the marketing literature. First it
explains organizational buyer behavior in a dynamic setting where vendors strive to
match incentives. Previous literature on trade promotion selections (Murry and Heide
1998) assumed that vendors don’t match incentives, therefore their results found that
higher incentives lead to better acceptance. This paper did not make that assumption. It
assumed that vendors would always match incentives knowing that retailers use that as
the primary decision maker. This paper explored how decisions are made even after
parity is reached in immediate economic benefits.
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The second interesting contribution of our study is the differential impact of the two types
of loyalty commitment in business relationships. While Kumar, Hibbard, and Stern (1994)
had talked only about the composite effect of affective commitment on behavior, in this
research we were able to dissect the effect into its two components. We were able to
individually show the effects of loyalty commitment to the selling firm (also called
organizational commitment) and loyalty commitment to the salesperson (also called
personal commitment) on behavioral commitment. We can see from table 35 that
organizational commitment has a bigger effect than personal commitment on behavior. It
would seem that companies/vendors who want to increase behavior commitment to
themselves would do better if they spend more time and effort developing organizational
commitment rather than developing personal commitment to their salespersons. It is not
to say that personal commitment is not important. However power differences,
calculative commitment, and organizational commitment play a more important role.
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Table 35: Main effects regression equation - comparing effects of different types of
commitments

Effect
Ranking

2
1
4
3

Dependent
Var:
Behavioral
Commitment
(% order to
Target vendor)
(Constant)
Power
Cal_Commit
Loy_Salesp
Loy_Org
Cal_Commit
x_Loy_sales
Cal_Commit
x_Loy_org
R = 0.373

Unstandardized
Coefficients

Standardized
Coefficients

B
52.048
-9.046
15.680
5.500
7.283

Std. Error
2.460
1.869
3.240
2.641
2.641

Beta

-3.322

3.740

-.066

-4.347

3.740

-.085

-.206
.357
.125
.166

R2 =0.139

It can be seen that calculative commitment plays the most important role, followed by
power asymmetry, loyalty to organization and finally loyalty to vendor salesperson. This
gradation of importance by itself is an important contribution to the marketing literature.

The third contribution of this study is that it used two theories to explain the behavior of
retailers under parity situations. While we used commitment theory to explain main
effects, we used the Heuristic Systematic Model borrowed from the CB literature to
explain the interaction effects. This research found support for the Heuristic –Systematic
model (Chaiken 1980; Eagly and Chaiken 1993) a choice theory which was originally
applied only in the consumer behavior area. We find that the HSM model does stand up
to empirical examination and is able to explain the behavior of purchasing mangers in a
B2B setting. This research study opens the path for the use of this interesting theory in
more B2B research studies.
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Finally this research clarifies contradictory hypothesis proposed by different theories
thereby helping in theory building. This study clarifies the role that power asymmetry,
calculative commitment and loyalty commitment play in decision making. It was able to
find strong support for some theories while proving that other theories may be applicable
only in certain circumstances.

Methodological Contribution
This research proposes a new way of testing power effects simultaneously, without
confounding its effects with calculative commitment. The use of the experimental
methodology allows us to make statements about causality much more strongly than by
using any other method.
Contributions to Practice
This research also makes contributions to managerial practice. First, it provides an
answer to executives that is not obvious. It explores and answers questions about how
decisions are made when parity conditions occur.

It also has a normative component in that it tells managers what to do in situations when
competitors match their offers, instead of constantly trying to outmatch the competition
by increasing incentives as that helps only the retailer. For example, it makes it clear that
if the vendor is more powerful it may make sense for vendors to develop calculative
commitment in the retailers rather than spending time and effort in developing
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relationship between the vendor salesperson and the retail buyer. This can be done by
offering more exclusive deals to the retailers, giving year end deals etc.

It also shows that if the vendor is less powerful it may make more sense to develop
loyalty commitment by doing more product development projects, including the retail
buyer in product development etc. The goal is that the retail company should feel loyalty/
affect for the vendor organization. They should get pride in being associated with the
vendor. This goes beyond the relationship based on personalities or only economic
benefits.

This research has a diagnostic element as it explains to managers why retailers choose to
make behavioral commitments to their competitors and not them even when they match
the competitor on all the economic criteria.

Finally it has public policy implications. This research clarifies that power does not tip
the scale against the weaker party. This research suggests that if everything else remains
equal, a weaker party would actually be preferred over a stronger party. It also tells the
weaker party what strategy is likely to work for them namely cultivating loyalty
commitment in the vendor rather than calculative commitment.

It clearly tells the smaller vendor that it is not likely to loose out always especially if they
match the initial economic benefit. Under some circumstances and with certain strategies
it can emerge a winner.
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Future Directions
This research being theoretical in nature, but set in a very practical business setting can
be extended to understand many interesting business phenomenon. For example, the
dissertation’s theoretical insights could be used to test the role of power and commitment
in different setting where there is likelihood of parity situations occurring, like hiring and
promoting employees, hiring new vendors, discontinuing old products etc. Also the
theoretical insights can be used to clarify the conceptual confusion in the literature
between power and calculative commitment.

Future research could also use other methods such as survey research to examine the
external validity and reliability of the experimental findings. Respondents could be asked
to recount their actual behaviors when they have faced parity situations. Such a study
would provide a good insight into how decisions are made in complex business situations.

This research explored how and why retailers choose trade promotions in general. Future
research could explore why certain types of trade promotions are chosen by retailers even
though they only offer future gains which are uncertain (choosing long term promotions
over short term promotions).

Limitations
This research has certain limitations which must be noted while interpreting the results.
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First, this research used a scenario based experimental method which is a simplistic
representation of the real world. Real world scenarios are much more complex and such
simplistic models might not work in real life. However, a role playing scenario allowed
us to improve the internal validity of the research model. The unfortunate side effect of
high internal validity is that external validity is sacrificed. Therefore the generalizability
of the findings are limited in nature.

Second, the scenario used in the experiment was based in a retail scenario and retail
industry constitutes only a small subset of the overall B2B universe. Therefore more
research needs to be undertaken to increase the generalizability of the findings in other
sectors.

Third, the answers provided by the respondents are self reported scores on hypothetical
scenarios. The scores are not reflective of how the same respondents might have behaved
in actually scenarios that they might have encountered in their real lives. These answers
reflected intentional behaviors and not actual behaviors.

Finally, the research used a sample of respondents that were not truly a randomized
sample. Part of the sample was from a panel while the other part was randomized.
Although we tested for the equivalence of the two samples in strict terms we cannot
claim that there was no bias associated with our sample.
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Appendix A – Sample Scenario
The following scenario is an example of Vendor more powerful than retailer, High
Calculative commitment with Target Vendor, High loyalty commitment with vendor
salesperson and High loyalty commitment with organization.

Cell 1
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Purchasing/Procurement Personnel Survey
Thank you for your interest and participation in this study
This study is part of a research project being conducted by the Marketing Department at Georgia State
University, Atlanta to better understand the attitudes and perceptions of purchasing/procurement
managers.
On the survey, there is no right or wrong answer to any question. We simply want to understand how
you are likely to respond to a hypothetical situation. Your responses will be held in strict
confidentiality. No individual’s answers will ever be reported in such a way as to identify that
individual.
INSTRUCTIONS
•

Your responses are very important to our research. Incomplete surveys will substantially
reduce our ability to conduct a good and workable research study, so we kindly request
your responses to all the questions in the surveys.

•

Please note that your responses will be analyzed with other respondents as a group.
You will not be personally identified. Hence, your open and candid responses are highly
appreciated.

•

If you have any questions regarding this study, please contact:
Amit Poddar
Robinson College of Business
Department of Marketing
Georgia State University
35 Broad St., Suite 1300,
Atlanta, GA 30303
E-mail: apoddar@gsu.edu
Ph: 404-651-1931

Dr Naveen Donthu
Katherine S. Bernhardt Research Professor
Robinson College of Business
Department of Marketing
Georgia State University
35 Broad St., Suite 1300,
Atlanta, GA 30303
E-Mail: ndonthu@gsu.edu
Ph: 404-651-1043
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Purchasing /Procurement Personnel Survey
For the purpose of this exercise assume that you are the purchasing manager for a $ 20
billion retail chain responsible for purchasing non branded bubble wrap. The majority of the
business comes from just two vendors. For the last three years you have been purchasing
approximately equal amounts of bubble wrap from each vendor (1 billion dollars each).
The first vendor: Acme Bubble Company is a very big and powerful $80 billion dollar
firm that you have been doing business with for the last 15 years which controls almost 80% of
the entire production of bubble wraps in the world. Acme is considered a very powerful company
since Acme literally sets the price for the entire global market for bubble wraps and hence Acme
commands tremendous respect in the business world. Acme is also four times larger than your
company in terms of revenue. Your company has been involved in joint research and
development with Acme for the last 10 years and you personally spearheaded this initiative with
Acme. You also have tremendous personal respect for Acme’s professionalism in business.
You also really like Bob Jones who is the sales person from Acme and is a personal
friend from your college days. You have been dealing with him even when he was not with Acme.
Bob is also a great salesperson and in the past has gone out of his way to do favors for you.
The second vendor, Simons Bubble Co, is a much smaller $20 billion firm that has also
been in the bubble wrap business for a long time. You have been doing business with them for the
last 3 years. Since Simmons total revenue is exactly equal to your company, you can say that
Simmons is equally dependent on you as you are on Simmons. The salesperson for Simons
Bubble Co is Tom White who was recently appointed and you have found him to be a decent and
honest man.
These bubble wraps are an important part of your product portfolio and you definitely
need to stock them to satisfy your customers. This is the last month of the financial year and you
are supposed to order 5 million cases of bubble wraps (worth $50 million). You generally give
the order to the company that offers the biggest trade promotion. Invariably one company always
has a cash promotion going on and you give the order to that firm. However this month, you have
been told by your assistant that both Acme and Simmons are running trade promotions and both
firms have the same amount of trade promotion on offer. It’s totally up to you to decide how to
divide the order or give the order to only one firm. Irrespective of whose product you choose,
the overall economic benefit to your firm is the same as these are generic products.
You have asked your assistant to make a side by side comparison of the two offers. In the
next page you would find the confidential report submitted by your assistant.

133

To: The Purchasing Manager
From: Assistant Purchasing Manager
Sub: Confidential
Comparison of trade promotion offers for purchase of Bubble wrap
Total Order size: 50 million dollars (5 million cases)
Our Turnover this year: $20
Billion
Approximate Global
Market Share
Total sales to our Firm (avg
last 3 years)
Total Yearly Turnover
Trade deal
Offer
Sales Person
Note
Note About Company
Other important
information

Acme Bubble Co

Simons Bubble Co

(recently named the most
powerful wrap company in
America)
80%

20%

$1 billion

$1 billion

$80 billion

$20 billion

Cash Discount

Cash Discount

$1 per case

$1 per case

Mr. Bob Jones
Your friend Bob made a personal
request that he needs this order
Joint research and development
program in progress for last 10
years
Likely to launch a new improved
product in the next few months and
we might get exclusive distribution
(our market research says that this
will be a high margin blockbuster)
Plus
Acme in the past has provided yearend bonus trade promotions for
meeting yearly targets.

Mr Tom White

--

You have to decide on whose trade offer to take and to what extent. Since the trade deals are
same in monetary value and the overall sales are also going to be the same, you are free to decide
on the split or even to give the complete order to one party, without concern that the audit
department might raise an issue. This being the last month of the fiscal year you can not really
say “let me accept trade promotion of one company this month and take the other next month”.
At this point, read the situation again and then make your decision as to what you would
normally do in real life if you are faced with a situation like this. Once your have decided, answer
questions regarding your choice on the next page.
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Please answer to the best of your abilities: There is no right or wrong answer.
1.

What percentage of the order would you provide to each firm? (You may provide the entire order to
one company or split the order between the 2 companies).
Company Name

% order size

Acme Bubble Co

_________%

Simons Bubble Co

_________%

Total

100 %

Briefly explain the rationale behind your decision

2.

For how much additional trade promotion (Number of cents over $1 per case) from the “loosing
company” would you be willing to change your order and place equal (50% each) order from both
companies?
For example, if in the above question you had decided that you would give Simmons Bubble Co 90%
and Acme Bubble Co 10% of the order; what amount of additional trade promotion (Number of cents
over $1 per case) from Acme would make you place equal order (50% Acme Paper Co and 50%
Simmons)
(Current Trade Promotion in dollars: $ 1 per case)
Additional Amount in Cents per Case:

3.

_____________ Cents

Please 3 your agreement / disagreement with the following statements
Your Company is more dependent on Acme than Acme is
 agree
dependent on your company

 disagree

Acme is more dependent on your Company than your
company is dependent on Acme

 agree

 disagree

Your company is equally dependent on Simmons as
Simmons is dependent on your company

 agree

 disagree

State the extent of your agreement or disagreement
with the following statements (please circle)

Strongly
disagree

Strongly
agree

4.

Acme Bubble Co can be considered more powerful than
your company

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

5.

Acme Bubble Co can be considered more powerful than
Simons Paper Co.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

6.

Acme Bubble Co is more likely to financially benefit your
company in the medium to long term.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

7.

Acme Bubble co is more likely to provide financial gains in
the near future

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8.

The relationship with Acme is more established and
important than the relationship with Simmons

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

9.

You are more likely to have a soft corner for Acme as
compared to simmons

1

2

3

4

5

6

7
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10. Which vendor’s salesperson you are more likely to feel a
strong liking for (choose only one option)

Salesperson
Name

Please 3

Bob Jones

a. 

Tom White

b. 

(Both are same)

c. 

11. In your opinion how often do you think the scenario
described above occurs in practice (meaning two vendors
who offer the same trade deal and you are forced to make a
choice)

Very
Rarely
1

State the extent of your agreement or disagreement
with the following statements (please circle)

2

Very
Often
3

4

5

Strongly
disagree

6

7

Strongly
agree

12. Acme Bubble Co is likely to keep promises it makes to our
firm

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

13. Acme Bubble Co is likely to be always honest with us.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

14. We are likely to believe the information that Acme Bubble
Co provides us

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

15. Acme Bubble Co is likely to be genuinely concerned with
our business needs.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

16. When making important decisions, Acme Bubble Co is
likely to consider our welfare as well as its own

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

17. We trust that Acme Bubble Co is likely to keep our best
interests in mind

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

18. Acme Bubble Co is likely to be trust worthy

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

19. We might find it necessary to be cautious with Acme
Bubble Co.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

20. Please mention the extent of your total work experience

a. 

Less than
5 years

c. 

11 years –
15 years

b. 

5 years to
10 years

d. 

More than
15 years

(Please 3)
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21. Which job title best describes your current position in the company (circle only one)
1. Purchasing Manager
6. VP of Purchasing
10. Purchasing Supervisor
2. Purchasing Agent
7. Materials Manager
11. VP of Materials
3. Purchasing
8. Materials Director
12. Asst Purchasing Agent
4. Purchasing Director
9. Buying Coordinator
13. Buyer
5. Other
22. Please check the industry which best describes the company you work in (circle only one)
1. Retailing
7. Engineering/Research
12. Transportation
2. Wholesale/ Distribution
8. Finance/Banking/Insurance
13. Publishing
3. Utilities
9. Food Service
14. Communications
4. Government
10. Service
15. Construction
5. Health Services
11. Lodging
16. Education
6. Other
23. Please indicate the size of your company in terms of annual turnover (circle only one)
1. Less than 5 million
2. 5 to 9.99 million
3. 10 to 24. 99 million
4. 25 to 49.99 million

5. 50 to 99.99 million
6. 100 to 199.99 million
7. 200 to 499.99 million
8. 500 to 999.99 million

9. 1 to 4.99 billion
10. 5 to 9.99 billion
11. 10 to 19.99 billion
12. 20 billion plus

24. Email address: _________________________________________
25. Gender -----------------------------------------------------------------  Male/  Female (Please 3)
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Appendix B- Informed Consent Form
Georgia State University
Department of Marketing

Informed Consent Form
Title:

Trade promotion choice study

Principal Investigator:

Amit Poddar

I.

Introduction/Background/Purpose: Research has shown that retail buyers face
more trade promotion choices than what they can accept. The purpose of the
study is to understand how retail buyers make choices especially when faced
with parity economic benefits

II.

Procedures: This exercise would not take more than 20 minutes. You will be
asked to respond to some hypothetical situations that would be presented to you.

III.

Risks: The research involves no risk to you or your company.

IV.

Benefits: The research adds to our knowledge of understanding choice
behavior. By participating you would be helping develop new knowledge which
would help future managers. Also since we would be sharing the findings of this
research with all the participating managers, you would be free to use the
findings in your own business environment.

V.

Voluntary Participation and Withdrawal: Participation in research is voluntary.
You have the right to refuse to be in this study. If you decide to be in the study and
change your mind, you have the right to drop out at any time.

VI.

Confidentiality: We will keep your records private to the extent allowed by law. We
will not be collecting your name or the name of your company. No facts that might
point to you will appear when we present this study or publish its results. You will
not be identified personally in the research findings. The email addresses collected
will not be sold or shared with any third party and will be used solely for the purpose
of sharing the findings of the survey

VII.

Contact Persons: Call Amit Poddar at 404 - 651-1931 if you have questions about
this study. If you have questions or concerns about your rights as a participant in this
research study, you may contact the Institutional Review Board (IRB) at Georgia
State University which oversees the protection of human research participants. Susan
Vogtner in the office of research compliance can be reached at 404-463-0674.
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Appendix C – Advertisements Used
Advertisements used in search advertising using Google adwords program.

Purchasing Manager Study
Participate in this Research Survey
By Georgia State University

Purchasing Manager Study
Improve your purchasing! Take part
in study by Ga State. Free report!

education.gsu.edu/sma

education.gsu.edu/sma

How do you choose vendors
if two vendors offer the same deal
Take part in Purchase Study at GSU

Improve your Purchasing
Purchase Managers. Take part in
this study today. Get free report!

education.gsu.edu/sma
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